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On the Function of Platonic Doctrines in Late Antique Commentaries on
Metaphysics A 9, A 6, and M 4
– an Example of Late Antique Knowledge Transfer
Gyburg Uhlmann
συνοµολογοῦσι δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι piάντες, ὅτι τὸ διττὸν τῶν ὀνοµάτων µεγάλην
ἀφορµὴν εἰς διαλεκτικὴν piαραδέδωκεν.
However, everyone else agrees, too, that the double meaning of words provides
a strong stimulus towards dialectics. (Simp. in Cat. 22,11-13)
Abstract:
The paper analyses the argumentative strategies of the ancient commentators on Aristotle’sMeta-
physics Α 9, Α 6 and Μ 4 and the functions ascribed by them to Aristotle’s doxographic reports
and critique. In discussing the use made of concepts from the Categories in the critique of
Platonic Forms the commentators elucidate the need for further differentiations for didactic pur-
poses in the institutional context of the philosophical schools of late antiquity. By doing this, the
paper argues, the commentators further develop Aristotle’s own argumentative strategy when he
transfers tools from his logical treatises into other contexts. The commentators’ transfer of texts
and conceptual tools into other textual contexts follows the skopos of enhancing understanding
of the meaning of the Aristotelian text. These acts of transfer constitute a new textual context
for the Aristotelian text commented upon, one that includes texts from Plato, Platonic sources,
Aristotle himself and earlier or contemporary commentators, each of which has its specific ar-
gumentative functions.
1 Introduction
This paper1 treats the constitutive role in generating knowledge that is played by discussion of
Platonic doctrines and authorities in the late antique commentaries on the Metaphysics. With this
perspective the paper concentrates on commentary on Metaphysics Α 9, and the part of Α 6 that
is inΜ 4 linked to the critique of Plato in Α 9.2
The paper is concerned with the argumentative functionalisations of doctrines termed Pla-
tonic by commentators who can be located in and around the late antique Platonic schools of
philosophy in Alexandria and Athens. Consequently, it will not simply be affirmed or denied
1The ideas presented in this paper were devepoled in the context of the SFB 980 Episteme in motion, funded by
the DFG (German research foundation). I am grateful to Sandra Erker, Arbogast Schmitt and Christian Vogel for their
helpful comments and suggestions and to Dieter Harlfinger for his support in dealing with glosses in the Par. Gr.
1853.
2 A further paper is in preparation which addresses analogous questions in relation to Α 5 and Α 8 and to Syrianus’
commentary onΜ and Ν and how commentators engage with Aristotle’s critique. The methods of argument and func-
tionalisations are similar to those of the discussion of Platonic doctrines, so the second paper should be understood
as a continuation of the present one.
1
whether Plato or the Platonists ‘really’ held the positions ascribed to them by Aristotle. That
problem is not the focus here.3 The concern here is rather to describe and analyse processes
by which new argumentative contexts are established. These are generated when the ancient
commentators cite texts from the Platonic (and Pythagorean) tradition and from the tradition
of Aristotelianism and commentary on Aristotle, turning them into a new horizon of under-
standing for the text commented upon and deploying them in argument. The result of these
processes is the differentiation and generation of a Platonic-Aristotelian culture of debate and
(appropriate to its skopos) of stocks of knowledge, which are differentiated ever further as this
traditional context develops.4
Reference to Platonic doctrines fulfilled important argumentative functions in late antique
commentary on Aristotle. It will be shown in the present inquiry that the commentators, by
embedding the Aristotelian text they are commenting on in a wider textual and traditional
context, guide the textual interpretation which they want to communicate to their students
towards differentiations. This is done by discovering contradictions within the newly estab-
lished textual context.
Such contradictions may be highlighted within an Aristotelian argument or with reference
to other statements in the Corpus Aristotelicum (especially in Book Λ of the Metaphysics or in
De anima Γ) or by confronting the text with Platonic texts that explicitly or implicitly recur to
Aristotle. Through this the generation of knowledge that occurs with and through the commen-
tary is transferred into new traditional contexts in a multi-level and multi-dimensional process
of knowledge transfer.5
Such functionalisations for argumentative purposes can be found in commentaries both on
3 In this approach I am indebted to the work of Gail Fine, who, with a focus on the Περὶ ἰδεῶν, has developed and
argued for a position that differentiates more as regards Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms. Gail Fine, On
Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms, Oxford 1993, passim, e. g. 28f. Fine stresses that in the Περὶ
ἰδεῶν Aristotle often takes as basis a vague Platonic position and then presents an interpretation of it that is literal
and seemingly obvious to us, which he then refutes (ibid., 28 and frequently). This more differentiated approach does
justice to the complexity of both the Platonic and Aristotelian thought and to their didactic ambitions; as such Fine’s
book shows the way also for analysis of the late antique commentators, who, in my view, are aiming for an analogous
differentiation and complex setting-into-relation of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines. This is frequently true in other
contexts for Simplicius at least, and is made explicit in some of the cases in Syrianus examined below. I also owe much
in method to the studies of Iamblichus’ De Pythagoreis by Dominic O’Meara, who does not aim to reconstruct (early)
Pythagorean doctrine, but rather to study the manner in which Iamblichus has used Pythagorean material and how he
develops a philosophical system in his work On Pythagoreanism (more correctly: On the Sects of the Pythagoreans):
Dominic O’Meara, Pythagoras revived. Mathematics and Philososophy in Late Antiquity, Oxford 1989, 31. Cf. also Bent
Dalsgaard Larsen, Jamblique de Chalcis. Exégète et Philosophe (2 Bde.), Aarhus 2002, 66-147.
4 This approach complements Jaap Mansfeld’s studies of prolegomena as a textual genre intended to facilitate
access by students of philosophy to a complex philosophical system (Jaap Mansfeld, Prolegomena: Questions to Be
Settled Before the Study of an Author Or a Text, Leiden 1994 (Philosophia Antiqua: A Series of Studies on Ancient
Philosophy)). The purpose of the textual genre of commentary is not presentation but the generation of this kind of
complex textual context within which the single text, the single argument, the single question can be contextualised.
5 The analysis of these processes of differentiation can contribute to a differentiated study, related specifically
to the substantive content, of simple qualifications such as obscurity or unclearness, which are explained as having
didactic purposes. On the interpretation of the obscurity of Aristotle’s language as a didactic tool, e. g. to exclude
the uninitiated, see Ineke Sluiter, Commentaries and the Didactic Tradition, in: Glenn W. Most (ed.) Commentaries
– Kommentare, Göttingen 1999 (Aporemata Bd. 4), 173–205, 185f., 192, who draws a picture that is in general very
critical of the stability of the process of tradition formation, which from a modern perspective seems uncreative
(e. g. p. 203); it seems to me that this picture needs to be differentiated by reflection on differences in the ways of
evaluating the generation and development of knowledge. Gail Fine has successfully done this for Aristotle’s Περὶ
ἰδεῶν (Gail Fine, On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms). It is now necessary to extend this work of
differentiation also to the ancient commentary tradition.
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Aristotelian texts and on Platonic dialogues6 as well as on texts by Nicomachus of Gerasa. From
this perspective, Aristotle’s criticisms of the Platonists in Α and Μ of the Metaphysics provides
one possible example of an argumentative functionalisation, but not the only one. A defence
by the Platonists against Aristotle’s critique is one aspect that can be observed here along-
side other functions.
To distinguish between apologetic and non-apologetic motives it can help to contextualise
the method used to deal with Platonic material within the wider context of debates about earlier
opinions, or in texts in which no explicit critique of these opinions is formulated, or where they
are cited in a different way.7 This method of argument is deployed in late antique commentaries
on Aristotle when discussing other thinkers and schools of thought, too, but, as I aim to show,
they have a particular character and focus in the analysis of Platonists:8 The debate with Platonic
positions draws attention to the need to introduce further differentiations when discussing the
conceptual or intelligible.
(Also) for this goal the methodical and terminological toolkit provided by the Categories
and the Organon as a whole is deployed. For the functionalisation of Platonic discussions it
is especially the conceptual pair homonymous-synonymous that is transferred into new contexts
and there developed further.
In what follows I shall proceed in three steps: (1) I sketch (already with an eye to the argumen-
tative techniques of the ancient commentators) the adaptive transfer of the terms ‘homonymous’
6 Stephen Menn has elaborated in an article how the transfer of Aristotelian arguments and texts differentiates the
Platonic texts themselves and extends their arguments, freeing them from aporiai: Stephen Menn, Self-Motion and
Reflection: Hermias and Proclus on the Harmony of Plato and Aristotle on the Soul, with a new critical edition of the
Greek Text by Oliver Primavesi, in: James Wilberding and Christoph Horn (eds.) Neoplatonism and the Philosophy of
Nature, Oxford 2012, 44–67. The article focuses on Hermeias’ commentary on the Phaedrus and sets out a theory,
of relevance far beyond this particular context, about the method of combining Platonic and Aristotelian texts or
arguments (e. g. ibid., 63). The differentiating moves presented in my article fit well into the horizon that Stephen
Menn has set out in such a differentiated way. However, Menn takes the view that the Aristotelian critique has the
skopos of improving or completing what was in fact inadequately thought out by Plato, by discovering aporiai and
inconsistencies that are really present and by thinking them through further (e. g. ibid., 49). My approach focuses,
in contrast, more on the processes and results than on the supposed intentions of Plato or Aristotle. The thought
processes that Menn describes as corrections are generally classed by the late antique Platonists instead as ‘thinking
through fully’, as a specific application of an established insight, or as a differentiating move of wider relevance than
just to one specific textual context; that is, they credit Plato or Aristotle with this ability to differentiate, and see their
own contribution as being to make this potential idea explicit and didactically available in the form of something
actually thought out. This yields different understandings of tradition, which need to be discussed and analysed more
precisely in the context of late antique Platonists and Aristotelians.
7 In a systematic discussion it would also be necessary to distinguish between commentary texts that are com-
menting upon a reference to Pythagorean or Platonic material in the base-text and those that themselves introduce
the reference to illuminate a passage. The first case is found – admittedly – in the commentaries on Metaphysics
Α 5 and 6, and Α 8 and 9, and on the corresponding passages in M, the second case e. g. in the commentaries of
Asclepius and Philoponus on the Isagoge of Nicomachus, and also in scholia in the vetustissimi of the manuscripts
of De interpretatione. See Nikos Agiotis, Kodex Guelf. 24 Gud. gr.: Transkriptionen von Scholien, Marginalien, Inter-
linearien zu Aristoteles, De interpretatione c. 1 – 4, in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca – Heuristik (Datenbank):
<http://cagb-db.bbaw.de/handschriften/handschrift.xql?id=R3VlbGYuIEd1ZC4gZ3IuIDI0>.
8 There is a certain proximity between treatments of Pythagorean and Platonic positions or those that accept Forms,
but also divisions and differences among them, despite a broad consensus among the commentators of the school
of Ammonius and in Simplicius that there are no important differences in content between the Platonic and the
Pythagorean. Such differences are nonetheless identified in the area of communicative forms and verbal procedure.
An example: Ascl. in Metaph. 44,11-17: ‘. . . and he [sc. Aristotle] says that he [Plato] followed the Pythagoreans in
much; we however say, not only in much but in everything. For the Philosopher was a Pythagorean even if he did
not use all their verbal veils (parapetasmata). For the Pythagoreans used not myths but symbols so that the hearers,
if they remained at the level of appearances, would suffer no harm [as with the Pythagoreans – Crux]. Besides, they
wanted to present them (sc. their doctrines) unclearly so that their wisdom would not be accessible also to cobblers.’
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and ‘synonymous’ in Aristotle himself and show how Aristotle differentiates and extends his own
terminology in the context of the Topics and other pragmateiai; (2) I describe the contextualisa-
tion of one argument against the Platonic Theory of Forms in A 9 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics as an
example of how this differentiating use and transfer of terms, as practised by Aristotle himself,
is continued in the case of the terminological pair homonymous-synonymous, which is trans-
ferred out of the propaedeutic formal logic into other argumentative contexts; and finally (3) I
investigate the ancient commentaries on this argumentation.
2 Homonymous-Synonymous in the Categories and its transfer
The terminologies presented by the Categories offer a very particular means of differentiation,
one that is located at an introductory level. Likewise related to the specific skopos of this work is
the distinction between homonymous and synonymous expressions with which Aristotle begins
the first chapter of the work.
῾Οµώνυµα λέγεται ὧν ὄνοµα µόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνοµα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας
ἕτερος, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωpiος καὶ τὸ γεγραµµένον τούτων γὰρ ὄνοµα µόνον
κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνοµα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος ἐὰν γὰρ ἀpiοδιδῷ τις τί ἐστιν
αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ζῴῳ εἶναι, ἴδιον ἑκατέρου λόγον ἀpiοδώσει. συνώνυµα δὲ λέγεται
ὧν τό τε ὄνοµα κοινὸν καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνοµα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός, οἷον ζῷον ὅ
τε ἄνθρωpiος καὶ ὁ βοῦς τούτων γὰρ ἑκάτερον κοινῷ ὀνόµατι piροσαγορεύεται ζῷον,
καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός (Arist. Cat. 1a1-10)
‘‘Homonymous’ is said of those things that have only a common name but a dif-
ferent meaning (λόγος) that belongs to the name, as, for example, man and a painted
man are each said to be an animal. For they have only the name in common, while
the meaning that belongs to the name is different. For if one were to answer the
question what ‘being an animal’ is in each of them, one would give each a concept
(λόγος) of its own. ‘Synonymous’, on the other hand, is said of that which has a
shared name and in which the meaning that belongs to the shared name is the same,
as for example a man and a cow are each said to be an animal. Each of the two is
called an animal by the shared name, and the meaning is also the same.’
The skopos of the Categories is to analyse simple predications relevant to practical life. It
shows how predications that are very different substantively and logically and which have dif-
fering valence may look the same verbally: whether I say, ‘That is Socrates’ or, ‘That is red’
or, ‘Man is a rational mortal animal’, the form of the predication looks the same, but describes
entirely different relations between the subject (ὑpiοκείµενον) and what is said about it (predi-
cate/ κατηγορούµενον). Consequently one cannot use them in argument in the same way; they
must be used differently and with different consequences. In order not to form false opinions
about things, one must therefore introduce further differentiations that go beyond the external
form of the predication.
With the pair of terms ‘homonymous’ and ‘synonymous’ (Cat. 1a1-12) Aristotle in the Cate-
gories is primarily distinguishing the predication of secondary substances from predications of
the other nine categories. If one predicates ‘man’ of an individual man as subject, then both the
word (όνοµα) and the meaning (λόγος) is predicated of this subject (the synonymous predica-
tion). If, on the other hand, one predicates ‘white’ of an individual body, the term is predicated
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of the body, but not the λόγος of ‘white’ (the homonymous predication) (Cat. 2a19-34). In the
case of other predications, ‘of something that is in a subject’, neither the term nor its λόγος is
predicated of the subject.
There are other contexts for the analysis of homonymy in Aristotle’s dialectic. The differ-
entiation of words that are said in multiple ways – of piολλαχῶς λεγόµενα – in order to avoid
homonymies, i.e. predications that look the same verbally but differ semantically, is one task of
dialectic as conceived by Aristotle in the Topics. His dialectic is designed to stand at the start of
the learning path and trains the students to broach basic philosophical questions by giving them
the tools to make distinctions and to know when it is important to distinguish something.9
Εἷς µὲν οὖν τόpiος τοῦ ἀσαφῶς, εἰ ὁµώνυµόν ἐστί τινι τὸ εἰρηµένον, οἷον
ὅτι ἡ γένεσις ἀγωγὴ εἰς οὐσίαν καὶ ὅτι ἡ ὑγίεια συµµετρία θερµῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν
ὁµώνυµος γὰρ ἡ ἀγωγὴ καὶ ἡ συµµετρία. ἄδηλον οὖν ὁpiότερον βούλεται λέγειν
τῶν δηλουµένων ὑpiὸ τοῦ piλεοναχῶς λεγοµένου. ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τοῦ ὁριζοµένου
piλεοναχῶς λεγοµένου µὴ διελὼν εἶpiεν ἄδηλον γὰρ ὁpiοτέρου τὸν ὅρον ἀpiοδέδωκεν,
ἐνδέχεταί τε συκοφαντεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἐφαρµόττοντος τοῦ λόγου ἐpiὶ piάντα ὧν τὸν
ὁρισµὸν ἀpiοδέδωκεν. µάλιστα δ΄ ἐνδέχεται τὸ τοιοῦτον piοιεῖν λανθανούσης τῆς
ὁµωνυµίας. (Arist. Top. 139b19-27)
‘One topos, then, of indistinctness is, if the definition is homonymous with some-
thing, e.g. ‘Becoming is a way into being,’ or ‘Health is the balance of hot and cold
elements.’ Here ‘way’ and ‘balance’ are each homonymous: therefore, it is not clear
which of the meanings of that which can have several meanings is meant. Equally,
also, if what is defined, is said in multiple senses and yet is said without differenti-
ation. For then it is not clear to which of them the definition given applies, and one
can then bring a captious objection because the definition does not apply to every-
thing of which the definition had been rendered. And that is particularly easy if the
definer does not see the homonymy.’
The Sophistici Elenchi complement this by pointing out the aporiai into which one is led by
overlooking homonymous predications or the secundum quid.10
Even though topics as a discipline is concerned with probable and non-scientific, or not scien-
tifically true, inferences, as a method of learning it nonetheless remains relevant for philosophy
itself, as Aristotle says in Book 8 of the Topics.11 This is because, as a method, it is a way of
testing the opinions or concepts and their meanings that we use in both thinking and speaking.12
9 See Top. Β 3 110a23ff; Α 7 and Α 15 106b13ff ; see in addition Top. Θ 14, 163b11ff. Cf. Andreas Beriger, Die
aristotelische Dialektik. Ihre Darstellung in der ’Topik’ und in den ’Sophistischen Widerlegungen’ und ihre Anwendung
in der ’Metaphysik’ M 1-3, Heidelberg 1989, 95. On the character of the Topics as an art of debating designed to lead
one to philosophy see Oliver Primavesi, Die Aristotelische Topik: ein Interpretationsmodell und seine Erprobung am
Beispiel von Topik B, München 1996 (Zetemata (München)), passim und e. g. 20.
10 The investigation of the forms by which knowledge is generated through transfer in the commentaries on Aristotle
can thus cite as precedent Aristotle’s own definition of how topics relate to the generation of knowledge in the Topics
and the Sophistici Elenchi; it builds on studies that have examined how the Topics or dialectical method relate to the
discussion and analysis of substantive philosophical issues in Aristotle himself. Cf. on homonymies, or the lack of
correspondence between things and words as a source of error in researches, Walter Leszl, Logic and Metaphysics in
Aristotle. Aristotle’s Treatment of Types of Equivocity and its Relevance to His Metaphysical Theory, Padova 1970, esp.
83ff. (SE 1 165a7ff) and cf. also J. T. Hintikka. Aristotle and the Ambiguity of Ambiguity, in: Inquiry II, 1959, 137ff.
11 Oliver Primavesi, Die Aristotelische Topik: ein Interpretationsmodell und seine Erprobung am Beispiel von Topik
B, esp. 58.
12 Top. 155b4-13. The late antique commentators on the Organon for this reason ascribe to it an anagogic role in
learning: Ps.-Ammon. in APr. 3,35f.
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In this there is an important role for the investigation of words that can be used in multiple
senses and which hence must in each case be examined precisely for the meaning relevant in
any individual usage.
Πότερον δὲ piολλαχῶς ἢ µοναχῶς τῷ εἴδει λέγεται, διὰ τῶνδε θεωρητέον. piρῶτον
µὲν ἐpiὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου σκοpiεῖν εἰ piολλαχῶς λέγεται, ἐάν τε τῷ εἴδει ἐάν τε τῷ ὀνόµατι
διαφωνῇ. (Arist. Top. 106a9-12)
‘Whether a word with regard to its meaning is said in multiple senses or just in
one, may be considered by the following. First, look and see if its contrary is said
in multiple senses, and whether the discrepancy between them is one of meaning or
one of name.’
Differentiation is here a way to extend and complete one’s own knowledge and begins with the
simplest forms of learning. Aristotle’s method is to begin from contradictions that arise when
identity in the verbal expression is not tested for possible difference in the form of predication
and in the meaning. From this arises the insight that here something is being said in multiple
senses (piολλαχῶς λέγεται) which need to be differentiated.
The object of the Sophistici Elenchi is to present examples of errors that arise if one does not
observe predications that look the same verbally but have different valences logically, that is, if
one does not correctly distinguish verbal expressions that need to be differentiated logically, i.e.,
homonymies. That is the first step in the method.
But Aristotle is not content to leave the different meanings of words and expressions all at
the same level. He is interested above all in those of the homonymous relations that are not
random but which are ‘ἀφ΄ ἑνὸς καὶ piρὸς ἕν’, that is, those that possess similarity on the basis of
a shared point of reference. The example that has drawn most attention in Aristotelian studies is
Aristotle’s statement, made in exactly this spirit, that ‘being’ is said in many senses:
Τὸ δὲ ὂν λέγεται µὲν piολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ piρὸς ἓν καὶ µίαν τινὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐχ
ὁµωνύµως (...) οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ὂν λέγεται piολλαχῶς µὲν ἀλλ΄ ἅpiαν piρὸς µίαν ἀρχήν
τὰ µὲν γὰρ ὅτι οὐσίαι, ὄντα λέγεται, τὰ δ΄ ὅτι piάθη οὐσίας, τὰ δ΄ ὅτι ὁδὸς εἰς οὐσίαν
ἢ φθοραὶ ἢ στερήσεις ἢ piοιότητες ἢ piοιητικὰ ἢ γεννητικὰ οὐσίας ἢ τῶν piρὸς τὴν
οὐσίαν λεγοµένων, ἢ τούτων τινὸς ἀpiοφάσεις ἢ οὐσίας διὸ καὶ τὸ µὴ ὂν εἶναι µὴ ὄν
φαµεν. (Metaph. Γ 2, 1003a33f. and 1003b5-10)
‘Being is said in many senses, but in relation to one thing and to a single definite
nature (. . . )
In this way, however, being, too, is said in many senses, but all in relation to a sin-
gle principle. For some things are said to be because they are substances, others be-
cause they are affections of substance, others because they are a route to substance,
or destructions, privations, qualities, productions or generations of substance or of
what is said relative to substance, or negations of one of these or of substance. For
even of non-being we say that it is non-being.’
This approach discovers a certain form of unity among the meanings by seeking not a mere sim-
ilarity of name that needs to be differentiated, but rather the reason for this similarity. Through
this it is revealed that the different predications, which are similar in meaning but different in
certain respects, can be matched to a certain difference in content, from which the different uses
of the word can be derived.
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The unity thus discovered hence comprises a hierarchical structure in which all elements are
related to the difference in content as primary meaning. This is the methodical principle by which
concepts are differentiated in Book Γ of theMetaphysics. Here too Aristotle traces the multiplicity
of the differentiated meanings of something to a connection and a primary meaning.
The second methodical step in the approach to homonymies is thus one that combines and
structures by adding an explanatory level. It seeks the grounds for the similarity, the διὰ τί. It rep-
resents a differentiation in function and argumentative strategy, relative to the simple distinction
between shared meaning and different meaning as found in the Categories.13 For that reason it is
used frequently in ontological passages and in passages in which findings are set in a hierarchy.
This search for causes and creation of hierarchy continues the differentiating move that be-
gan with the simple distinction, to avoid contradictions, of expressions that can be used in many
senses. For by accepting a hierarchical connection between the meanings of words a new possibil-
ity is opened up: the logical errors to be avoided (sc. if one thinks that it is a synonymous relation)
can be understood as indicating a real connection, though one that requires differentiations if it
is to be understood without contradiction. Both of these two methods generate knowledge, but
the second one supplements the first with a further aspect, as the explanation for the familiar
linguistic usage is provided and, through this, new knowledge is generated.
The commentators on Aristotle’s critique of Plato (and Pythagoras) make lavish use of this
encouragement to further differentiate and increase the degree of complexity of the matter under
examination by differentiating levels of predication.14
I present Syrianus’ approach as one first preparatory example for what I will show more
precisely and in more detail in the third main part of my paper (ch. 4): Syrianus practises
the described method when he wants to demonstrate that Aristotle has knowingly overlooked
homonymies and so has falsely referred a statement that refers to a certain level of signification
to a different one. This is not just an apologetic method of argument, as one might think at first
glance; in terms of argumentative strategy it above all makes explicit, and hence comprehensible,
the connection between these two confounded levels, i.e. a didactic horizon is opened up, what
can be shown by the following argument from Syrianus’ commentary.15
13 Christof Rapp, Ähnlichkeit, Analogie und Homonymie bei Aristoteles, in: Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung
46, 1992, 526, 537 with reference to Hans Joachim Krämer, Zur geschichtlichen Stellung der aristotelischen Meta-
physik, in: Kant-Studien 58, 1967, 313–354, 338.
14 E.g. Phlp. in GC 130,28-131,7: ὥσpiερ δέ, φησί, piολλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀνοµάτων piολλαχῶς λέγεται, καὶ τῶν
piολλαχῶς λεγοµένων τὰ µὲν ὁµωνύµως λέγεται (ὡς Αἴας ὁ Τελαµώνιος καὶ ὁ ᾿Οιλέως, καὶ κύων ὅ τε χερσαῖος καὶ ὁ
θαλάττιος) ἅpiερ καὶ ἰσοτίµως µετέχουσι τοῦ ὀνόµατος, τὰ δὲ ἀφ΄ ἑνὸς καὶ piρὸς ἕν, ὧν καὶ τὸ µὲν κυριώτερον λέγεται
τὸ δὲ ἀκυρότερον (οἷον ἐpiὶ τοῦ ὄντος piρώτως µὲν καὶ κυρίως ἡ οὐσία ὄν, δευτέρως δὲ καὶ τρίτως αἱ ἄλλαι κατηγορίαι
ὁµοίως κυρίως µὲν ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωpiος ὁ ἀληθινός, τὸ δὲ γεγραµµένον ἀpiὸ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ ζῷον καλούµενον οὐ κυρίως
καλεῖται ζῷον ὁµοίως ἡ µουσικὴ ἐpiιστήµη καὶ ἡ ἀpi΄ αὐτῆς µουσικὴ γυνὴ ἢ µουσικὴ κιθάρα, piρώτως δηλονότι καὶ
κυριώτατα ἐpiὶ τῆς ἐpiιστήµης τὸ τῆς µουσικῆς κατηγορεῖται ὄνοµα).
15 George Karamanolis has proposed a related hypothesis to explain the skopos of Syrianus’ commentary, by looking
for positive functions and functionalisations of the Aristotelian arguments for the sake of philosophical teaching:
George Karamanolis, Porphyry, the first Platonist Commentator of Aristotle (Supplement to the Bulletin of the Institute
of Classical Studies, vols. 83.1-2), in: P. Adamson, H. Baltussen, and M. Stone (eds.) Science and Exegesis in Greek,
Arabic and Latin, London 2004, 79–113, n. 18; cf. also Cristina D’Ancona, Syrianus dans la tradition exégétique de la
‘Métaphysique’ d’Aristote. 2, Antécédents et postérité, in: Marie O. Goulet-Cazé (ed.) Le commentaire entre tradition et
innovation, Paris 2000, 311–327, who stresses Syrianus’ important role in two respects: 1. Syrianus won acceptance
for the commentary technique of Alexander of Aphrodisias as a mode in the Neoplatonic schools; 2. he ended the
insistence on seeing Aristotle as an authority exclusively for the study of logic and established him as an authority also
for the treatises on specific subjects. She sees one result of Syrianus’ Metaphysics commentary as being the refutation
and hence silencing of Aristotelian arguments that do not themselves possess positive functions.
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Τούτων οὕτω piροειληµµένων οὐ διαφωνοῦσι Πλάτων καὶ Πυθαγόρας καὶ οἱ pi΄
αὐτῶν piρὸς λλήλους piερὶ τὴν τῶν εἰδῶν ὑpiόθεσιν, ὥς φησιν Α᾿ριστοτέλης, λλ΄ οἱ
µὲν Πυθαγόρειοι piερὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν piρῶτον διαλεγό- µενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὀνόµασιν
ἐχρῶντο κατ΄ ναλογίαν αὐτὰ µεταφέροντες ἐpiί τε τὰ µέσα καὶ τὰ piρώτιστα τῶν
piραγµάτων, ὅθεν καὶ ἔδοξαν, οὐκ ᾿Αριστο- τέλει φαίην ῾ἄν᾿, λλὰ τοῖς ἐpiιpiολαιότερον
τ κείνων ἱστορήσασι, piερὶ µόνων τῶν χωρίστων εἰδῶν διαλέγεσθαι. (Syrian. in
Metaph. 83,12-18)
‘Once these things have been set out in this way first, Plato and Pythagoras and
their followers agree among themselves about the acceptance of Forms, as Aristo-
tle says, but the Pythagoreans, because they began their inquiries with the sensible
things, used the same names, by analogy transferring them also to the median and
first level of things; by this they were thought – not, I should say, by Aristotle but by
those who investigated their teachings more superficially – to have been discussing
only the inseparable Forms.’
The adequate distinctions are not to be found in language itself; instead one must everywhere
reckon with homonymous uses of terms, which are to be discovered in the process of advancing
knowledge through commentary, a process that will guide one to differentiations. Syrianus here
explicitly denies that Aristotle is guilty of any error in argument.
That fits with Syrianus’ ‘Praefatio’ to his commentary on Metaphysics Μ, where he emphati-
cally recognises Aristotle as an authoritative teacher, and does so with explicit reference not only
to the works in logic, ethics and natural science, but also to the Metaphysics, and there especially
to Books Ζ and Λ.16
But how should we then assess his strategy of reminding Aristotle, through fictional apostro-
phes, of the basic principles of his own Metaphysics and conceptual system, which, so Syrianus,
is in agreement with the work of differentiation undertaken by the Platonists?
In this ‘Praefatio’ Syrianus leaves open the grounds that may have led Aristotle to the attacks
on the Platonic theory of Forms, attacks which, in Syrianus’ view, miss their target.17 However,
he presents the observation that the attacks are in reality not directed against the Platonic doc-
trines at all, but ‘against his own hypotheses’ (sc. of Aristotle about these doctrines) (Syrian.
in Metaph. 80,21f.).
In content and in relation to Aristotle himself, Syrianus thus sees no need for clarification,
and so also no need for detailed refutations; however, such a need does exist, in his view,
for didactic purposes:
οὐδὲν µὲν ἐχέγγυον οὐδὲ ἱκανὸν piρὸς αὐτὰς λέγοντα, τὰ piολλὰ δὲ οὐδὲ piρὸς
αὐτάς, εἰ χρὴ τ΄ἀληθὲς ἀpiροφασίστως εἰpiεῖν, ἀpiαντῶντα, ἰδίαις δὲ ὑpiοθέσεσι τὰς
ἀντιλογίας piροσάγοντα, εὔλογον ὤφθη φειδοῖ τῶν ἁpiλουστέρων ἀκροατῶν, ὡς
ἂν µὴ τῇ δόξῃ τῇ δικαίᾳ κατεχόµενοι τ΄ ἀνδρὸς εἰς καταφρόνησιν ὑpiενεχθῶσι
τῶν θείων piραγµάτων καὶ τῆς ἐνθέου τῶν piρεσβυτέρων φιλοσοφίας, βασανίσαι τὰ
ῥηθέντα κριτικῶς ἅµα καὶ ἀδεκάστως εἰς δύναµιν, καὶ ἐpiιδεῖξαι τάς τε Πυθαγόρου καὶ
Πλάτωνος piερὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν θεωρίας ἀνελέγκτους καὶ ἀpiτώτους διαµεµενηκυίας, ῾καὶ
τὰς᾿ Α᾿ριστοτέλους κατὰ τούτων ἐpiιχειρήσεις τὰ piολλὰ µὲν piαρὰ θύρας ἀpiαντώσας
καὶ οὐδὲν τοῖς θείοις ἀνδράσιν ἐκείνοις piροσήκοντα σκέµµατα διερευνωµένας,
ὀλιγάκις δὲ λέγειν µέν τι piρὸς αὐτὰς καὶ ἀpiοτείνεσθαι piροθυµουµένας, ἔλεγχον δὲ
16 Syrian. in Metaph. 80,4-7 und 9-14.
17 Syrian. in Metaph. 80,16f.
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οὔτε ἐλάττονα οὔτε µείζονα piροσφέρειν δεδυνηµένας. (Syrian. in Metaph. 80,22-81,2)
‘. . . though here he says nothing that comes close or is adequate to them, and in
large part he does not engage them at all, if one may speak the truth honestly, and
instead presents counter-arguments against his own theories, it seemed reasonable,
out of consideration for the simpler students – so that they are not taken in by
the genuine authority of the man and hence carried off into despising the divine
things and the divine philosophy of the ancients – to test what has been said by
differentiation and at the same time as impartially as possible and to demonstrate
that Pythagoras’ and Plato’s theories about first principles remain unrefuted and
unshaken, and that Aristotle’s attempts against them in many cases miss their target
and do not at all consider problems appropriate to those divine men and, when they
occasionally strive to say something relevant to them and to touch upon them, they
are not able to advance a refutation of either smaller or greater extent.’
The citation of other Aristotelian treatises is thus really directed at students of philosophy, who
rightly see Aristotle as a great authority. However, since they follow a still simple and, as it were,
literal interpretation, they are to be guided to the correct intellectual approach by reference to
his own doctrine. This allusion by Syrianus to Aristotle’s own method matches in method the
differentiating approach pursued by Gail Fine in her book on Aristotle’s De ideis, just as it does
also with the attempt here to trace the differentiating moves made by Aristotle himself and by
the late antique commentators since Syrianus.18
The commentators on Aristotle and the discussions among the Platonists are hence, in this
sense, not misusing Aristotle’s terminology when they use it to analyse his argumentation against
the Theory of Forms; rather, they are building on a method of approach that Aristotle himself had
proposed in the Topics and other treatises, when he further developed and applied the concepts
of homonymy and synonymy to uncover logical fallacies.19
In discussions of the Theory of Forms the same distinction is moulded and applied in a quite
different way by the ancient commentators on the Metaphysics: a differentiation is made between
predications on particular things and predications on Forms, which logically and ontologically
precede the particular things as thinkable possibilities and principles; this differentiation is re-
quired by the substantive issues in question. The commentators are here setting themselves in a
18 Thomas Alexander Szlezák, Die Lückenhaftigkeit der akademischen Prinzipientheorien nach Aristoteles’ Darstel-
lung in Metaphysik M und N, in: Andreas Graeser (ed.) Mathematik und Metaphysik bei Aristoteles, Bern 1987, 45–67,
49-51 points out that in this distinction Aristotle is oriented towards a ‘Modell des zeitlichen Werdens wahrnehmbarer
Dinge’ (50, ‘a model of the generation in time of perceptible things’), and that the possibilities cited by him are ‘klar-
erweise nur auf wahrnehmbare Substanzen anwendbar’ (ibid., ‘clearly only applicable to perceptible substances’). This
allows him to conclude: ‘In der Tat liegt dem Vorwurf der Unterlassung einer wesentlichen semantischen Unterschei-
dung letztlich eine Meinungsverschiedenheit über Zielsetzung und Natur der akademischen Frageweise zugrunde.’
(50, ‘In fact the charge of leaving out an essential semantic distinction is ultimately a difference of opinion about
the goals and nature of the Academic style of enquiry’) Overall he wishes to show that the objections that Aristotle
advances (above all against the fact that the Platonic doctrine has gaps) are not justified, to the extent that they do not
consider the internal consistency of the theories but demand from them explanations that do not even arise within
the horizon of their own questions/system. This accords with Fine’s approach, viz. that Aristotle is refuting his own
construction of Platonic doctrines (cf. p. 2).
19 See below p. 20. Stephen Menn has proposed for such processes of applying a concept to different content three
Arabic terms (tashbîh, ta‘t.îl, tanzîh), which focus primarily on the religious and ontological problems arising from
the simple transfer of forms of predicate and the need to ‘purify’ such erroneous simple transfers: Stephen Menn,
Self-Motion and Reflection: Hermias and Proclus on the Harmony of Plato and Aristotle on the Soul, 49f. In my view
this does not pay enough attention to the late antique commentators’ systematic use of the opportunity to undertake
differentiating transfers in and out of different contexts (even in readings of the dialogues).
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Platonic tradition of uncovering homonymies in the context of clarifying problems in the Platonic
Theory of Forms. Paradigmatic for such efforts to differentiate is the commentary offered on the
discussion of Forms in the first part of Plato’s dialogue Parmenides; we first encounter this com-
mentary as a connected account in Proclus.20 Reciprocal influences with the peripatetic tradition
of commentary on Aristotle are here very probable.
The adaptive transfer of the pair of concepts from the Categories into other argumentative
contexts is, furthermore, paradigmatic for the use of the conceptual apparatus of the Organon in
commentaries on the Aristotelian treatises on specific subject-matters and on Platonic dialogues
as a whole. For the late antique Aristotle commentators use the propaedeutic dialectic, the in-
struments provided by (Isagoge,) Categories, De interpretatione and the syllogistic, as a didactic
resource for the hermeneutic study of the texts they comment upon. This corresponds to the
Neoplatonic school curriculum, which had been established at latest since and by Iamblichus,
in which training in the techniques of the Organon provided the armoury of tools needed for
philosophical teaching, something that was therefore taught at the beginning of a student’s ed-
ucation.21 This also corresponds to the teaching activity of Plotinus’ student Porphyry, who was
probably the first to integrate Aristotle into the philosophical teaching of the Platonic schools as
a second central teaching authority.22
The fact that this conceptual armoury was available and ready for use by the recipients
is reflected in the commentators’ frequent practice of making explicit the logical figures in
the Aristotelian argumentation. This is also revealed by the use of visual figures represent-
ing the three Aristotelian logical figures in the marginal glossing of the manuscripts of Aris-
totle, which appear alongside textual glosses containing excerpts from the late antique commen-
tators on Aristotle.23
However, not only the Aristotelian treatises, but also texts and concepts from the Platonic
tradition were interpreted on the basis of Aristotle’s Organon.24 The investigation of the presence
of concepts from the Organon, and commentary on them, in the commentators on Plato and in
other Platonic text forms, as well as in other, non-logical commentaries on Aristotle, can yield
important insights into the reciprocal inter-relation between the exegesis of Plato and of Aristotle.
It can also cast light on the links between, and the equal standing of, the exegesis of Plato and
20 Examples from Procl. in Prm. (on 128b): Proclus uses the Aristotelian terminology as the (first) logical approach:
῞Οτι δὲ εἶναι δεῖ τὸ ἓν ὂν piρὸ τοῦ piλήθους, λάβοις ἂν διὰ µιᾶς µὲν ἐφόδου λογικῆς τοιαύτης ἢ ὁµωνύµως λέγεται τὸ
ὂν κατὰ τῶν ὄντων piάντων, ἢ συνωνύµως, ἢ ὡς ἀφ΄ ἑνὸς καὶ piρὸς ἕν ...; (on 130e): explicitly stating the need for
differentiation of similar predications: 851,5-852,26; (on 133d): 93919ff. explicitly citing Aristotle.
21 Cf. Leendert Gerrit Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, Amsterdam 1962, preface; id.,
The Alexandrian commentators and the introductions to their commentaries, in: Richard Sorabji (ed.) Aristotle trans-
formed. The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, Oxford 1990, 325–348 stresses that a standard form became
established for the introductions to the commentary texts, which were of importance for didactic purposes, and the
stability of this form.
22George Karamanolis, Porphyry, the first Platonist Commentator of Aristotle.
23Cf. the exemplary edition of Nikos Agiotis, Kodex Guelf. 24 Gud. gr.: Transkriptionen von Scholien, Marginalien,
Interlinearien zu Aristoteles, De interpretatione c. 1 – 4, in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca – Heuristik (Datenbank):
<http://cagb-db.bbaw.de/handschriften/handschrift.xql?id=R3VlbGYuIEd1ZC4gZ3IuIDI0>. A research project under
my direction is currently engaged in the study of these glosses and their significance for the movements of knowledge
in and by the Aristotelian treatises.
24 An example to which I shall return is Alexander’s summary of the discussion in Περὶ ἰδεῶν in his commentary on
Α 9, 990b15, where he presents the grounds why the Platonists cannot accept Forms of relatives. That is excluded
because for them the Forms are something that subsists in itself, whereas relatives have their being in their relation
(σχέσις) to one another: Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 83, 24-26. With this Alexander’s summary is applying criteria from
the Categories (Cat. 6a36-b2) to the discussion about the Forms. See in detail below, p. 21.
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Aristotle in the teaching practices of the Neoplatonic philosophical schools.25
3 Homonymy and Synonymy in MetaphysicsΑ 9,Α 6 andΜ 4
Strategies of argument by the ancient commentaries aimed at discovering homonymies as a
source of logical errors occur with special frequency and with a specific skopos in the lemmata to
the discussion of Platonic and Pythagorean doctrines. The reason for this is that the method of
differentiation by resolving homonymies is a relatively simple procedure which, through teach-
ing of the Categories, was established and already well practised in the initial phase of teaching.
As the discussion of the Forms concerns matters in the sphere of the purely conceptual, which
are hence especially hard to communicate and approach, a familiar and simple-to-use method of
differentiation is especially helpful for didactic purposes.
The functionalisation of this differentiating procedure can be investigated paradigmatically
by comparing the commentaries on Metaphysics Α 9, and within them taking the example of the
commentary on Α 9, 990b15-17.
ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστατοι τῶν λόγων οἱ µὲν τῶν piρός τι piοιοῦσιν ἰδέας, ὧν οὔ
φαµεν εἶναι καθ΄ αὑτὸ γένος, οἱ δὲ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωpiον λέγουσιν. (Arist. Metaph.
990b15-17)26
‘Further, of the most accurate arguments, some lead to Ideas of relations, of which
we say there is no class of its own, and others introduce the ’third man’.’
This passage treats the consequence that acceptance of the kind of Forms imputed to the
Platonists by Aristotle would entail the necessity of accepting Forms of relatives and would lead
to an argumentation in which ‘the Third Man’ is introduced, that is, in which there is an infinite
regress in pursuit of an explanatory level.
I shall first discuss the context of the argument in Aristotle in order to be able to consider
the strategies of the commentators. Then I analyse Alexander’s commentary in the editio vulgata,
after which I draw out the differences in the altera recensio and in Asclepius and Syrianus (in his
commentary on the parallel passage in Μ 4, in which the arguments from Α 9 considered here
are differently contextualised).27
Aristotle in Chapter 8 begins his second survey of the conceptions of earlier thinkers.
Whereas Chapter 8 is devoted to other positions, including Pythagorean ones, in Chapter 9
he turns to those that accept Forms.28 The question that Aristotle now poses is: what does
reference to Forms contribute to the search for the causes of things, which is Aristotle’s con-
cern in Α as a whole?29
25 Karamanolis argues that it was Porphyry who first accepted and used Aristotle as an authority in philosophical
teaching of equal value to Plato and in agreement with him: George Karamanolis, Porphyry, the first Platonist Com-
mentator of Aristotle, esp. 100; see on the didactic function of the commentary literature as a whole: Ineke Sluiter,
Commentaries and the Didactic Tradition.
26 Primavesi inΑ 9 convincingly argues for the reading ἀκριβέστατοι and thus follows the α-tradition and Alexander’s
lemma.
27 Syrianus’ commentary responds in its argumentation to the different context created by Aristotle in Μ 4, for
which reason I have not been able to present the four commentators’ strategies towards the passage of Α 9 under
discussion in a strict chronological arrangement.
28 Oliver Primavesi, Second Thoughts on Some Presocratics (Metaphysics A 8, 989a18-990a32), with a new critical
edition of the Greek Text by Oliver Primavesi, in: Carlos Steel (ed.) Aristotle’s Metaphysics Alpha. Symposium Aristo-
telicum, Oxford, 225–264, 226-229.
29 On the differentiation of the goal of argument in Chapters 3-7 relative to Chapters 8-9 see 988b16-21.
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In brief, and at times in an abbreviated form that cites material already familiar, he presents
various arguments against the validity of the Theory of Forms.30 These all, in different ways,
concern the question of the kind of similarity between particulars and Forms, and the aporiai
that can be derived from such relations of similarity if the Forms are to serve as explanatory
causes for the particulars.
In our passage (990b15-17) Aristotle debates a way of understanding this similarity which
he terms ‘very well thought through’ or ‘most precise’ (ἀκριβέστατον), but which he nonetheless
criticises with the argument that two aporiai arise from them, and indeed either both together
or at least one of the two. These two aporiai are, firstly, the acceptance of Forms of relatives,
which ‘we’ reject, as Aristotle says, placing himself within the Academic tradition, or, secondly,
the infinite regress which (as Alexander says) had been known since the sophists and Plato’s
Parmenides (Prm. 132a-133a) by the name ‘the Third Man’, that is, the argument that if one
assumes Forms that are similar to particulars, then a higher Form must also be assumed as the
common feature shared by the two similar relata.31 In what follows I will concentrate on the first
part of this critique (except for the analysis of the exegesis of Syrianus and Asclepius, where the
discussion of ‘the Third Man’ is included.)
Aristotle’s formulation here is very brief.32 Our question, thus, is: how does a most exact
form of expression and differentiation lead to the acceptance of Forms of relatives (which was
according to Aristotle rejected by Platonists33 as impossible)?
3.1 Aristotle’s use of ‘homonymous’ and ‘synonymous’ inΑ 6 undΑ 9
Taking a cue from the arguments about similarity that define the Chapter, it seems most obvi-
ous to look for the connection at the point where a differentiation is sought in the predication
of something (universal) about particulars.34 For the opening brief arguments cite a position
that identifies the Forms directly with the abstract universal that can be predicated of many par-
ticulars (ἓν ἐpiὶ piολλῶν b7f.) alongside those particulars. The demonstration that this cannot be
adequate determines the arguments in the chapter up to this passage.
If the λόγος that is now under discussion is more exact, then it must introduce a further
differentiation.35 What that is is not made explicit by Aristotle himself and can therefore only be
30 Gail Fine, On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms, vii sees in this a tactic by Aristotle, which
seeks to indicate the faultiness of what is presented through the confused character of the presentation. However, she
differentiates between the position of Plato himself and the interpretations of it to which Aristotle responds or which
he constructs, and which he then in his refutations charges with a systematic lack of transparency.
31 William David Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, reprinted 1953 with corrections, Oxford 1924, 194-196. The problem
is discussed in detail from the aspect of self-predication of the Forms by John Malcolm, Plato on the Self-Predication
of Forms: Early and Middle Dialogues, Oxford 1991.
32 See the interpretation by Gail Fine, On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms, 197-202 in debate
with Robin, Leszl und Cherniss: Léon Robin, La théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres d’aprés Aristote.
Étude historique et critique par Léon Robin, Ann Arbor 1908; Walter Leszl, Aristotle’s Conception of Ontology, Ann
Arbor 1975; id., Logic and Metaphysics in Aristotle; Harold F. Cherniss, Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato and the Academy,
Baltimore 1944.
33 Dorothea Frede, The Doctrine of Forms Under Critique (Part 1), with a new critical edition of the Greek Text by
Oliver Primavesi, in: Carlos Steel (ed.) Aristotle’s Metaphysics Alpha. Symposium Aristotelicum, Oxford 2012, 265–296,
272, speaks of ‘unwelcome forms’.
34 See on this below fn. 46, with reference to the interpretations of ibid. and Gail Fine, On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism
of Plato’s Theory of Forms, 197-202.
35 Fine, too, pleads for a distinction between the ‘Accurate One over Many Argument’ discussed here from the first
‘One over Many Argument’ and proposes that Aristotle introduced this second argument to soften his critique of
the Platonic Theory of Forms: ibid., 201. That is interesting, as the proposal ascribes to Aristotle an intention to
differentiate through the interpretations of the Theory of Forms which he is critiquing.
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established indirectly.
In the spirit of the Categories (Cat. 1a1-12) it would be most obvious to seek this differentia-
tion in the analysis of a homonymous relation between Form and particular. Aristotle makes this
possibility explicit at three points inΑ (987b9f.; 990b6f.; 991a5-8).36
Already inΑ 6, in a much-discussed passage that recounts the genesis of the Theory of Forms,
he reports that due to the fact that sensibly perceptible particulars are subject to alteration
and change, Plato had ruled out the possibility that universal definitions could refer directly to
particulars (987b6f.). For that reason he called that which could be a universal concept a ‘Form’.
However, these universals can only be predicated indirectly of the particulars, via the Forms (κατὰ
ταῦτα), which are apart from the particulars (987b7-9).
This is followed by a hard-to-interpret formulation, which poses exegetical problems that are
reflected also in the manuscript transmission. The sentence has been elucidated in a recent close
study by Carlos Steel.37 Picking up the line of thought in the commentators’ discussion I here
supplement Steel’s reflections by proposing two differentiations: one with regard to Aristotle’s
argument itself and one with regard to Alexander’s exegesis.
κατὰ µέθεξιν γὰρ εἶναι τὰ piολλὰ τῶν συνωνύµων [ὁµώνυµα] τοῖς εἴδεσιν (987b9-10)
‘for the many that is synonymous with the Forms is [sc. something definite] by
participation in them’
The transmission is (1) τῶν συνωνύµων in Laurentianus 87.12 and in Alexander, Ascle-
pius and Moerbeke’s translation, and (2) ὁµώνυµα in combination with τῶν συνωνύµων in
Parisinus Graecus 1853.
The reading ὁµώνυµα is unknown to both Alexander and Asclepius. It is worth examining
whether this is a later marginal explanation of τῶν συνωνύµων which has entered the text in the
course of transmission. The character of such a marginal note and the grounds for its appearance
would need to be sought in the text of Aristotle, an attempt I shall now make.
Steel38 begins his interpretation of the sentence quoted above with a summary of Alexander’s
exegeses.39 As regards Aristotle he ultimately comes to the conclusion that there is no ground to
assume that Aristotle must be imputing to Plato the view that Forms and particulars stand in a
homonymous relation, because the Parmenides passage cited does not use ‘homonymous’ in the
strict sense of the Categories as ‘only homonymy’ but rather in the simple sense of having the
same name, without any further differentiation of the meanings involved.40
Steel stresses that Aristotle in Α 9 explicitly understands Plato’s view as accepting the thesis
that Forms and particulars must be synonymous with one another. In that case, however, he must
also accept that the two have the same essence; if Plato were to contest that, the result would be
the position, unacceptable to Plato, of strict homonymy. In Α 6, so Steel, Aristotle refrains from
36 On homonymy and synonymy in the Theory of Forms: G.E.L. Owen, A Proof in the Peri Ideon, in: Journal of Hel-
lenic Studies 77, 1957, 103–111; Christopher Shields, Order in Multiplicity: Homonymy in the Philosophy of Aristotle,
Oxford 1999; Terence Irwin, Homonymy in Aristotle, in: Review of Metaphysics 34, 1981, 523–44, Gail Fine, On Ideas:
Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms, 144-151.
37 Carlos Steel, Plato as seen by Aristotle (Metaphysics A 6), with a new critical edition of the Greek Text by Oliver Pri-
mavesi, in: Carlos Steel (ed.) Aristotle’s Metaphysics Alpha. Symposium Aristotelicum, Oxford 2012, 167–200, 177-180.
38 ibid., 177-180.
39 At the end he also refers to an analogous passage in Proclus’ commentary on the Parmenides, which addresses the
question why Plato in the Parmenides says of the particulars that they are homonymous with the Forms. Alexander’s
attempts to explain this will be discussed below in debate with Steel’s arguments.
40 Carlos Steel, Plato as seen by Aristotle (Metaphysics A 6), 179.
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raising the problems related to the rejection of a shared substance, and the differentiations they
would prompt, and understands by ‘synonymy’ the similarity with regard to name and being.41
A focus on the strategy of argument suggests, as an option for interpreting Aristotle, a further
differentiation of these reflections, if we consider even more specifically the different strategic ar-
gumentative contexts in the passage cited and in the two passages inΑ 9 (990b6f.; 991a5-8).42
Aristotle begins Chapter Α 9 by creating a connection between the Theory of Forms and the
search for causes. In their search for the causes of things, the Platonists had assumed Forms and,
as something that is apart from the particulars, they had counted an equal number of them in
addition (990a34-b2); in reality, so Aristotle, this had added no explanatory content.
From this argumentation Aristotle in 990b6-8 says that there is something homonymous
which can be predicated of sensibly perceptible and of eternal things as an abstract universal
(‘as one over many’). What usage of the term ‘homonymous’ should we assume in this passage,
in which Aristotle is trying to establish, in a way relevant to the search for causes, that there
is not a difference between the particulars and the Forms, the latter being identified with the
abstract universal concept?
Clearly it is here not, or not directly, possible to apply the usage established in the Categories
(1a1-12). There, as we have seen, something is homonymously predicated if it is predicated of
something else with the same word (ὄνοµα) but a different meaning (λόγος). The focus is on this
simple distinction between homonymy and synonymy as respectively the mere sharing of a name
or also of a commonmeaning, in which there is a difference of meaning in homonymy.
However, in the expression ‘homonymous’ the accent can also be placed on the fact that there
is a shared name, but that no inquiry has yet been made into the relation between the meanings
(λόγοι), i.e. that this quality remains for now undefined.
Such a usage is found in Plato, who terms the Forms homonymous with the particulars in the
Parmenides (133d3), Timaeus (52a5) and Sophistes (234b7). In the Parmenides the passage is part
of the propaedeutic, anagogic-didactic exchange between Parmenides and the young Socrates.
The specific context is an aporia into which Parmenides wants to lead Socrates: if he accepts
that the Forms and knowledge of them cannot be related to the particular and knowledge of
it, then it follows that it is in principle impossible to know anything at all. The description
of the particulars as the same merely in name is part of this argument, which leads into the
aporia but which thereby indicates the need to introduce more distinctions. If the particulars
are the same as the corresponding Form only in name, the resulting separation of particular
thing and particular knowledge from Form and knowledge as a whole would entail a series of
aporiai that would present a basic challenge to the possibility of rational knowledge and rational
discourse (135b6-c4).
In the Sophistes the argumentative context does not relate directly to the distinction between
particular and Form. Instead its aim is to define the production of appearances by the sophists
by classing the sophist’s art as one of the mimetic arts. It is said here that the products of this
imitative art of producing appearances generate imitations which are homonymous with that
which is, and hence they are able to deceive the young, but this statement about homonymy does
not exclude a similarity in content. This would in fact be necessary for a successful deception,
even though the emphasis is here on the difference between that which is and a mimetically
41 Carlos Steel, Plato as seen by Aristotle (Metaphysics A 6), 180.
42 Gail Fine distinguishes between an ‘extreme’ and a ‘moderate’ understanding of homonymy, by which the ‘moder-
ate’ understanding does not exclude a possible similarity of the λόγος, or partial overlap (Gail Fine, On Ideas: Aristo-
tle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms, 145f.). It seems to me important to broaden this ‘moderate’ understanding
through further, context-specific differentiations.
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produced appearance.
The Sophistes passage is thus of interest for the fact that it generates a need for differen-
tiation, for the purposes of argumentative strategy. The differentiation concerns the question
what defines the separate nature of the λόγος of the predication, viz. is it defined in reference to
realised definite instances, or in reference to independent versus dependent being?
The situation is a very similar in the passage in the Timaeus, which appears in the well-
known context, relevant to the Theory of Forms, of the introduction of matter as a third principle
alongside Forms (Ideas) and eidetic definition in the particulars. Here it is said of the immanent
forms that they are ‘homonymous [with the Forms/Ideas], similar to them, secondary, percepti-
ble, generated, are always moved about, came into being at a particular place and in turn perished
from there, are apprehensible by opinion together with perception’ (52a5-8). Of these immanent
forms Timaeus also says that they are imitations of that which always exists (50c4f.). They too
are thus assigned both a substantive difference with regard to their manner of being and also a
similarity with regard to the εἶδος realised in a particular thing. Thus one is entitled to trans-
late both interpretively as either/both ‘only the same in name’ or else/as well as ‘showing their
sameness in their name’.
Aristotle thus has a predecessor in Plato in using the term ‘homonymous’ in the con-
text of an argument that calls for differentiations and makes it possible to place emphases
on different aspects.
The second passage in Α 9, 991a5-8, adopts the simple distinction of concepts used in the
Categories, too, but here it is used in the same sense as in the Categories.
εἰ δὲ µὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος, ὁµώνυµα ἂν εἴη, καὶ ὅµοιον ὥσpiερ ἂν εἴ τις καλοῖ ἄνθρωpiον
τόν τε Καλλίαν καὶ τὸ ξύλον, µηδεµίαν κοινωνίαν ἐpiιβλέψας αὐτῶν. (Arist. Metaph.
991a5-8)
‘But if they have not the same form, they will be homonymous, and it is as if one
called both Callias and a wooden image ’man’, without observing any commonality
between them.’
Aristotle once more formulates the dilemma of the similarity of the particulars and the Forms:
if one posits that the definition (εἶδος, which is the same as the λόγος in the Categories) of the
Forms is the same, there must be something common to both Form and particular; but this leads
to an infinite regress. If, in contrast, one posits that the substantial being (εἶδος or λόγος) of the
two is predicated in a solely homonymous way, then we are dealing with a weak kind of similarity
which does not take any account of the commonality that exists between the two. Aristotle’s
example is Callias and a wooden statue of Callias.
It is implied that here too one could say that ‘Callias’ is predicated of Callias and of his
likeness strictly homonymously in the sense of the Categories. By this, however, one would
be neglecting the commonality in their definition (κοινωνία); that is, this commonality is left
underdefined. Aristotle thus makes clear indirectly that to answer these questions it is necessary
to differentiate the simple distinction of the Categories on which his argument is based, though
he does so, admittedly, without presenting such a solution himself.
What is sought is a defined difference among the meanings (when some commonality exists),
and this could be understood, in the spirit of the Platonic Theory of Forms, as the distinction
between proper (κυρίως) and improper (µὴ κυρίως or δευτέρως) predication.
This differentiation in the predication corresponds, further, to the position that Aristotle
himself favours in his analysis of homonymous relations i.e. in the Metaphysics, when he con-
15
siders the way in which two predications refer to one thing (piρὸς ἕν). With this, however, both
Plato and Aristotle set up a hierarchy in which one thing is ‘properly’ something, while another
thing is only ‘improperly’ or secondarily so. secondarily so. ‘Socrates’ is predicated properly of
the teacher of Plato, but improperly of an image of Socrates. One meaning is that of the model,
the other that of the likeness. The differentiation helps one to understand the substantive point
that something can be similar to something else, and similar in a way defined by content, without
it necessarily being granted the same ontological status.
Against this background we can (following Steel) construe the genitive in the passage at
987b9f. as a genitive of definition and translate ‘the many, which is synonymous with the
Forms, is [sc. something definite] by its participation in them’. ‘Synonymous’ thus refers to
the sameness in meaning (λόγος) that must necessarily be presupposed, but not to an abso-
lute identity in essence.
We can now propose that the reading ὁµώνυµα in Par. Gr. 1853 was originally a gloss on
τῶν συνωνύµων in 987b9f.43 (1) It can be affirmed that the gloss indicates the need to clarify the
verbal usage; when we examine the ancient commentaries we will see that this necessity was seen
very clearly by the commentators and that a detailed explanation was provided. (2) It hints that
assuming a relation of simple synonymy between Form and particular leads necessarily to aporiai,
and that for that reason the other side of the relation of similarity needs to be supplemented, viz.
the necessity that there be a defined dissimilarity of meaning. Thus the reading of Par. Gr. 1853
at this passage reveals that the reader is presented with a double possibility: the particulars
have a homonymous relation to the Forms insofar as they stand apart in ontological status,
but a synonymous relation insofar as their definition (their λόγος) depends on the Forms and
is the same as them, even if, on a more differentiated view, only dependently and secondarily
the same or similar.
The gloss ὁµώνυµα makes explicit these options for differentiation, which go beyond the still
simple distinction of the Categories. It thus pursues strategies of argument that we will be able
to identify also in the commentaries by Alexander, Asclepius and Syrianus on the passages in
question,44 but not in Aristotle himself. In this passage (though not in the analogous discussion
in theΠερὶ ἰδεῶν) he keeps the argumentation at a simpler level, in which the sameness of content
in a predication is derived from the concept of participation, and hence he speaks of a synonymy
in the sense of the Categories.
43In this codex there are at this point two marginalia (dated by Dieter Harlfinger to the 13th or early 14th century, i.e.
about 400 years after the codex had been written), that attest (1) knowledge of the other reading and (2) awareness of
the three ways of understanding τῶν συνωνύµων, τῶν ὁµωνύµων (as an interpretation of τῶν συνωνύµων), τὰ piολλὰ
τῶν συνωνύµων and of the problems that are involved in these meanings. In the first and shorter gloss the writer is
refering to another reading in other manuscripts that have τὰ piολλὰ τῶν συνωνύµων, τοῖς εἴδεσιν. I include also a
transcription of the longer one (added to τὰ piολλὰ at the bottom margin) by Dieter Harlfinger, with many thanks: τὰ
καθέκαστα καὶ κατὰ µέρος ταῦτα καὶ αἰσθητὰ τῶν piραγµάτων, ἐν µεθέξει φησὶν ἔλεγε piλάτων εἶναι τῶν ἰδεῶν ἀιδίων
οὐσῶν καθόλου ὄντα λεγόµενα, ὁµωνύµως τοῖς εἴδεσι τὸ δὲ τῶν συνωνύµων οἱ µὲν, ἀντὶ τῶν [τῶν s.l.] ὁµωνύµων ὡς
εἴpiοµεν ἐξελάβοντο οἱ δὲ, ἀντὶ τοῦ, συνωνύµων. τὰ γὰρ piολλὰ τῶν συνωνύµων. ὡς οἱ καθέκαστα piάντες ἄνθρωpiοι
οἵ, εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις συνώνυµοι καὶ οἱ ἵpipiοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι, µεθέξει τῶν ἰδεῶν εἰσὶν εἴρηκε δὲ τοῦτο τὸ piολλὰ,
διὰ τὸ, µὴ piάντων ἰδέας τὸν piλάτων τίθεσθαι τῶν γὰρ κατὰ σχέσιν οἷον τῶν piρός τι [vel piρόστι], οὐκ ἐτίθετο ἰδέας.
ἀλλ΄ οὐδὲ τινὸς τῶν piαρὰ φύσιν οὐδὲ ὅλως τῶν κακῶν. It reflects different meanings of the term “homonymous” and
“synonymous” respectively.
44There is, of course, a sofar unresolved question whether and in which regard there is a byzantine tradition that in
some way continues this kind of dealing with Aristolian concepts by transferring them into new contextes and thereby
differentiating or changing them; and whether the glosses in the Par. Gr. 1853 are responding to that tradition.
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3.2 Homonymy and the Acceptance of Forms of Relatives inΑ 9 andΜ 4
This differentiation enables us to work out an understanding of the argument that Aristo-
tle briefly hinted at, namely how the acceptance of Forms of relatives comes about (on Α 9,
990b15-17). For the investigation into the usage of the conceptual pair synonymous-homony-
mous by Aristotle in Α 9 has shown that he implicitly alerts the reader to the need,
in the context of the discussion of the Forms, to differentiate this terminology borrowed
from the Categories.45
Aristotle describes the briefly mentioned argument, as we have noted, as ‘most precise’. The
thesis that will be presented here links this to the discussion above and takes the very great
precision of the new argument to lie in differentiation of how the Platonic concept of partici-
pation is understood.
At the start of Α 9 the Form is identified with ‘one that can be said of many in the same
way’. If the argument on which 990b15-17 is based differentiates this definition, then probably
by means of a more precise definition of the relation between Form and particular.46
The complex of problems that may arise from this is made clear by Aristotle with reference
to Forms like ‘equal’, ‘different’, ‘double’ etc. If, then, instead of the simple formulation ‘one that
can be said of many’, here the Form is accepted as the model (piαράδειγµα), which is properly
(κυρίως) that which is predicated of the particulars, the question arises of how (i. e. properly or
secondarily) for example, ‘equal’ can be predicated.
If we accept that ‘equal’ is predicated of the particulars in strictly homonymous fashion,
because they are not ‘properly’ equal in the way that the Form is, but rather find themselves
(quantitatively) in constant change, then we must accept a Form of the Equal in an entirely analo-
gous way to every other thing of which a Form is accepted; for none of the particulars is ‘equal’ in
the sense of a model and none in the sense of a likeness, but rather ‘equal’ is predicated of each
synonymously, i.e. with the same meaning. Consequently, there is a need for a further instance
that is to be distinguished, which Aristotle here calls ‘Form’.
This corresponds to the argument mentioned previously by Aristotle, which derives the Forms
from knowledge of something and, on this basis, introduces Forms of everything possible of
which one could form an opinion (990b11f.).47
The ‘most precise logos’ thus, in Aristotle, still demands further differentiations, for here too
more falls under the term than the Platonic tradition accepts, as Aristotle says (ὧν οὒ φαµεν εἶναι
καθ΄ αὑτὸ γένος 990b16f.). Aristotle argues against this assumed or constructed tradition and
points out possible internal contradictions.48
Now, it is admittedly by no means clear from the start that Aristotle is here correctly reporting
‘the’ Platonic tradition. For acceptance of a Form of the Equal is only problematic for the Platonic
45Simplicius (in Cat. 24,6-25,9) places in his commentary on Cat. 1 a1ff. – while further developing the explanations
of other (anonymous) commentators and refering to Plato as an authority– emphasis on the fact that the dissolving
of homonymies itself is not a task of differentiating words but of recognizing the distinctness of certain objects.
Therefore, homonymies refer to processes of differentiation by reflecting on the distinguishable object (piρᾶγµα).
46 The arguments presented here confirm and make explicit the systematic differentiation, proposed by Gail Fine in
relation to Aristotle’s criticisms of the Theory of Forms in Περὶ ἰδεῶν, between less precise (i.e. abstract universal) ar-
guments and those more precise arguments that are problematic in that they entail acceptance of Forms of things that
Platonists did not wish to accept: Gail Fine, On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms, 201ff. Dorothea
Frede, too, concludes that the greater precision characterises better justification: Dorothea Frede, The Doctrine of
Forms Under Critique (Part 1), 273 and ff.
47 Cf. this explanation in Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 83,17-13.
48 Alexander stresses that the demonstration that the theory of Forms, along with its arguments, does not yield what
it aims to defend, and, further, that it introduces forms of more things than it aims to, shows that the theory of Forms
refutes itself and requires no external arguments to be refuted: Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 78,21-25.
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tradition in certain circumstances. After all, Plato in the Phaedo, in a central, much discussed
passage, emphatically uses this very example in discussion of the Forms (Phd. 73c-75d). In the
Parmenides, too, Forms of relatives like Size and Difference are mentioned (131cf.), as also among
the µέγιστα γένη of the Sophistes (254a-259b).
Accepting this is problematic only if one understands relatives in the way intended in the
Categories, which makes statements about how we predicate something of particulars and of
universal concepts that we abstract from particulars. For only then is it clear that statements in
the category of the piρός τι are statements about something that is in a subject and hence has no
independent being. Aristotle seems here to assume this perspective as an argumentative strategy
for debating the Theory of Forms.49
This does not mean that he regards this use of terms and this method of approach as ad-
equate to the corresponding dialogue passages and doctrines in Plato. These are models of
argument that possess a value for sensitising the reader and the learner of philosophy. For
they make clear the problems that arise if the Theory of Forms is interpreted against this back-
ground. The assumption that the Theory of Forms must be discussed or understood in this
way and no other would be a further, additional assumption, which Aristotle’s argumentation at
least does not require.
In the discussions on the τὶ ἦν εἶναι and in Book Λ Aristotle himself uses other kinds of
differentation,50 different from those of the Categories,51 which argues for the view that his
confrontational combination of the Categories’ tools for predication-analysis with the Platon-
ists’ discussion of Forms, which is concerned with the adequate grounds for knowledge, is an
argumentative strategy with a didactic purpose. The argument thus has a specific function, par-
ticularly in the context of the Academy as a teaching institution, but one within a tradition that
is itself continuously developing through differentiation, and not, or not necessarily, a position
that is attacking it from outside.52
It is with this premise, that is, with the perspective of the Categories, that Aristotle next treats
the tensions between the Platonic theory of first principles (of monad and dyad) and the Theory
of Forms, and here too the abbreviated argument presupposes that numbers are understood as
something that is relative to something else. That is, numbers are understood as instruments for
counting something,53 which likewise corresponds to the perspective of the Categories, with its
focus on predicating something of particulars.54
49 Cf. Alexander’s summary of the piερὶ ἰδεῶν: in Metaph. 82,11-83,34 and 85,15-24.
50 The transfer of these texts into the context of the critique of Forms is one of the most important argumentative
strategies of the ancient commentators, on which see below.
51 On the problem of the concept of substance in the Categories and inMetaph Ζ see the outstanding analysis and ex-
planation by Rainer Thiel, Aristoteles’ Kategorienschrift in ihrer antiken Kommentierung, Tübingen 2004 (Philosophis-
che Untersuchungen), 58-66.
52 Dorothea Frede takes the view that Aristotle himself made the argument mentioned by him here on the basis
of his Categories and in a critical spirit as part of the school discussions within the Academy: Dorothea Frede, The
Doctrine of Forms Under Critique (Part 1), 277 and see G.E.L. Owen, A Proof in the Peri Ideon, 111.
53 See on this Gyburg Radke, Die Theorie der Zahl im Platonismus. Ein systematisches Lehrbuch, Tübingen/Basel
2003, 475-481.
54 See the summary of the context of the piερὶ ἰδεῶν by Alexander: in Metaph. 86,5f. On this see Gail Fine, On Ideas:
Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms, 174-182. Fine stresses in her analysis of Aristotle’s arguments, with
reference to the problems raised by Forms of relatives, that Aristotle imputes a certain position to Plato and then
refutes it. She takes the view that Aristotle thus poses the right questions and indicates serious weaknesses in the
Platonic position. E. g. ibid., 190. One’s ultimate assessment of the argumentative strategy is, as is shown by the
interpretations of Owen, Fine and Frede, dependent on one’s interpretation of Plato’s Theory of Forms. However, as
a (provisional) conclusion in this debate, Aristotle’s argumentation can be seen as a strategy of differentiation which
– whatever Plato’s position was – made possible an increase in knowledge with regard to predication and the grounds
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In this regard it is interesting to consider the other argumentative contextualisation that
Aristotle gives the arguments from Α 9, in Μ 4 and 5, because a theme in Μ is the link to Plato’s
theory of Forms of numbers. As has been shown by others55 the two doxographical approaches
that Aristotle undertakes in Chapters 6 and 9 pursue different goals: Α 6, as part of the first
critique in Chapters 3-6, has a limited skopos and is striving to maintain aspects that confirm and
make plausible the correctness of its distinction of causes (Α 3, 983b1-6 and Α 7, 988a21-23);
Chapters 7-9, on the other hand, investigate the doctrines of earlier thinkers more thoroughly and
from a perspective that is expanded specifically in each case.
Against this background of the order of arguments in Α, their re-arrangement in and forΜ 4
and 5 and their transfer into a new argumentative context in a way that differentiates the argu-
ments (or any other kind of transfer that alters them) is noteworthy: elements of argumentation
from the first approach (Α 6) are now brought together with those from the second part of the
critique (Α 9),56 and this is done in a new context for the discussion of the Theory of Forms from
Α, viz. the questions posed in Μ (and Ν) whether, and if so which, substances exist aside from
the perceptible ones.
In the present inquiry, which is attempting to understand the argumentative strategies of the
late antique commentators and the functions ascribed to the doxographic statements, the central
issue is not the genesis of the text of the Metaphysics,57 but rather the effects of this transfer on
the argumentative strategy of Aristotle himself, as we have seen (on the readers of his treatise)
and on the exegetical practice of the commentators.
The comment and interpretation has often been made that, in the course of the re-combina-
tion of the arguments from Α 6 and Α 9 in Μ 4, Aristotle presents a new definition of how the
genesis of Plato’s Theory of Forms relates to Pythagorean number theory.58 Μ 4 divides consider-
ation of the Forms or their introduction by the Platonists (among whom Plato is not mentioned by
name inΜ), on the one hand, from the doctrine of the Pythagoreans about the Forms of Numbers
on the other. The Forms are now exclusively derived from the Socratic-Heraclitean nexus.
The Pythagoreans are mentioned (alongside Democritus), but only with the statement that
they, unlike Socrates, had not elevated the question ‘What is F?’ to a general principle of
method, but had only inquired into the definition of a few things, a definition that they iden-
tified with numbers.
Socrates had in this way created the basis of a general dialectic, but had always remained
focused on the things to be defined, without considering them separately from one another.
This had been done first by the Platonists with the result that now, analogously to the Socratic
method, they were obliged to accept that there were Forms of everything of which one can ask
the question, ‘What is it?’ (1078b27-34).
Now, this is precisely the point at which the example from the start of Α 9 is (seamlessly)
attached and now, unlike in Α 9, it is used to demonstrate the problems that arise from this
Socratic origin. The further argumentation in Μ 4, unlike the identical passage of Α 9, stands
directly under the premise that it is to be related to the Socratic search for definitions and the
of knowledge.
55 Oliver Primavesi, Second Thoughts on Some Presocratics (Metaphysics A 8, 989a18-990a32), 226-229.
56Α 6, 987a32-b7 corresponds toΜ 4, 1078b12-25; Α 9, 990b2-991b9 corresponds toΜ 4/5, 1078b34-80a8 passing
over 1079b3-11.
57 Sc. the relation of the later Book Μ to Book Α, which was composed earlier. Cf. Werner Jaeger, Studien zur
Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles, Berlin 1912, 28-37.
58 Dorothea Frede, The Doctrine of Forms Under Critique (Part 1), 266, Julia Annas, Aristotle’s Metaphysics M and N.




The separation of mathematical substance and Form follows strictly from the argumentative
strategy deployed in Μ 1: Aristotle wants to analyse the question of non-perceptible substances
by means of a survey of the doctrines developed to date. To this end, the mathematical sub-
stances are to be considered first separately and in themselves, and then the intelligible sub-
stances separately and in themselves (1076a22-28).
Aristotle mentions explicitly that among the earlier doctrines there were positions that link
the two, take them together or identify them, but for the sake of analysis they must be considered
separately (1078b9-11). After the announcement of this intention follows the narrative account
of the genesis of the Theory of Forms (1078b11-13 and ff.). Aristotle says we ought to consider
the Forms separately from the mathematical substances and that we should also think of them
in the same way as when the Theory of Forms was first devised. The doxographical narrative is
thus not a justification of this way of proceeding but is brought in as additional support for the
chosen form of argument.
Μ 4’s division of Pythagoreans from Socrates (sc. and not of Pythagoreans from the Platonic
theory of Forms) sets the accent on the fact that it was Socrates who first pursued the ‘What is?’
question with stringent and universalising logic. In contrast, in Α 6 the Pythagoreans were not
compared with Socrates but rather their terminology was compared with that of Plato. In Μ 4,
in the spirit of the stated approach, no relation is posited between the Forms as substances and
mathematical entities introduced by the Pythagoreans, but only between the Socratic definitions
and the Platonic Forms; it is assumed that the latter were identical to the Socratic concepts but
were merely assigned a different ontological status. (The question of what affinities there could
have been between Plato and the Pythagoreans is not touched upon at all.)
Μ 4, 1079a11-13, which is identical to Α 9, 990b15-17, thus has a different argumentative
context from the parallel passage in Α 9, namely one in which the immanent universal concepts
of Socratic horistic have shown the way to address the problems that are then raised. For the
question is then asked what the consequences would be if one were to say of such concepts (sc.
Socratic, as just defined) that they have the status of independent substances.
This applies also for the possibilities that this argumentation offered for differentiation, or
reflections on differentiation, as we find them among the ancient commentators, i.e. not with
regard to the genesis of the text of theMetaphysics, but with regard to the arrangement of the text
that existed in late antiquity. These are now involved directly in the debate about the immanent
universal (which is developed by Aristotle in Ζ) and a separate universal, with Aristotle ascribing
to the separate universal no other, or no more differentiated, definition than the one that has
developed out of the Socratic dialectical question of definition.
4 The Commentaries on Metaphysics A 6, A 9 and M 4
The task is thus to explain, in and through the text of Aristotle, the various possible ways of
understanding similarities between particulars and Forms, in the sense of the Platonic theory
of Forms and its critics, and how they are contextualised or transferred into specific similar,
different or new contexts. This task is taken up by the surviving commentaries in different ways,
but their arguments are always based on making explicit Aristotle’s argumentative structure as
derived from the Organon.
To analyse these differences I begin from the fact – widely attested and occasionally reflected
upon – that the later commentaries draw on the material and results of the oral and written exege-
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sis by others and integrate this into their texts.59 This method of text production is itself already
an important characteristic of the process of tradition-formation being investigated here. How-
ever, this does not, as one might suppose, lead directly or necessarily to assuming that the pro-
cess was ‘merely traditional’ or assuming stagnation in the production of knowledge. It is rather
a means for a different kind of development in knowledge and differentiation, which cannot be
adequately described by the simple dichotomy of innovation versus (uncreative) tradition.
The differences among the commentators lie essentially in the way in which Aristotle’s argu-
mentative structure is evaluated and set in relation to the doctrine that is treated and criticised,
but not, however, in the evaluation of Aristotle’s intentions, which are throughout assessed pos-
itively and hence also developed further in a constructive way for didactic purposes. That does
not mean that harmony between Aristotle and the Platonic tradition is presupposed or hinders
the philosophical analysis. In fact, every argument is sorrowly analysed and evaluated.
The evaluations of his intentions often begin with the formulation, favoured by Aristotle, by
which he himself is included by use of the first person plural in the tradition of Platonic doctrine
that is being critiqued. The need to explain this inclusion by Aristotle of himself in the Platonic
tradition prompts Alexander to insist, right at the start of his commentary on Α 8, that Aristotle
does so with the best of intentions, aiming for the truth (Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 77,35-78,4).60
4.1 Alexander, editio vulgata
Alexander’s commentary on Α 9 summarises the tenor of the debate about the Platonic theory of
Forms into the criticism that the relation of similarity between particulars and Form contributes
nothing sufficient for an analysis of causes. This is shown already in the fact that he sees the
core of the first argument about the doubling of the world by the world of Forms not in numerical
equality but in similarity; for the analysis of causes, he writes, this would mean that something
unknown would be supposed to be explained by something else just as unknown (Alex. Aphr.
in Metaph. 76,21-26).
Alexander then emphasises that Aristotle in the first argument is not making the claim that
the Platonists double the particulars with the Forms, but that they double the abstract universal
concepts of the species, for it is only of these, and not of the individuals, that one can seek
the defining causes.61 This is important because now his basic approach becomes apparent,
namely that the Theory of Forms is worked out in the course of the chapter into a means of
differentiating the simple opposition of particulars and abstract universal concepts, which name
the undifferentiated commonality in a set of many things and have no independent ontological
status. Only then can the Theory of Forms be plausible, or at least more plausible.
The need to move beyond the identification with the abstract commonality in the definition
of Forms runs through the whole of the commentary on the chapter, in which Alexander – in-
terpreting Aristotle – stresses that if κοινά are equated with Forms one will necessarily have to
accept many Forms of things of which the Platonists do not want to accept Forms: of negations,
relatives and non-being. This is part of the summary that Alexander gives, from 79,3 to 85,13,
59 Of importance here are the studies by Philippe Hofmann (e. g. Philippe Hoffmann, Les catégories aristotélici-
ennes pote et pou d’après le commentaire de Simplicius. Méthode d’exégèse et aspects doctrinaux, in: Marie-Odile
Goulet-Cazé et alii (ed.) Le Commentaire entre tradition et innovation, Paris 2000, 355–376) and Pantelis Golitsis (Pan-
telis Golitsis, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la "Physique" d’Aristote: Tradition et Innovation,
Berlin/New York 2008 (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina)).
60 And cf. on Α 9, 990a15: 83,30-32; Ascl. in Metaph. 71,26-29; Alex. Aphr. alt. rec. 78 ad 4. On the ‘we’ in Α and in
Μ cf. Dorothea Frede, The Doctrine of Forms Under Critique (Part 1), 269f. and n. 12, who notes the possibility that
the difference between Α and Μ arises through a development in Aristotle’s thought.
61 Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 77,4-6.
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of Aristotle’s argument in the first book of Περὶ ἰδεῶν, because this forms the background to the
abbreviated critique in Α 9.62
This is the background to Alexander’s distinction between a homonymous and a synonymous
predication of ‘equal’ of particulars and of Forms, by which he tries to elucidate the argument
about positing Forms of relatives, arguing in an analogous way to his lemma on Α 6, 987b6 (in
Metaph. 50,19-51,25).
κατηγοροῦµεν δὲ τῶν ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἴσον αὐτὸ ὁµωνύµως αὐτῶν κατηγορούµενον
οὔτε γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς piᾶσιν αὐτοῖς ἐφαρµόζει λόγος, οὔτε τὰ ἀληθῶς ἴσα σηµαίνοµεν
κινεῖται γὰρ τὸ piοσὸν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ µεταβάλλει συνεχῶς καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν
ἀφωρισµένον. ἀλλ΄ οὐδὲ ἀκριβῶς τὸν τοῦ ἴσου λόγον ἀναδεχόµενον τῶν ἐνταῦθά
ἐστί τι. ἀλλὰ µὴν ἀλλ΄ οὐδὲ ὡς τὸ µὲν piαράδειγµα αὐτῶν τὸ δὲ εἰκόνα οὐδὲν γὰρ
µᾶλλον θάτερον θατέρου piαράδειγµα ἢ εἰκών. εἰ δὲ καὶ δέξαιτό τις µὴ ὁµώνυµον
εἶναι τὴν εἰκόνα τῷ piαραδείγµατι, ἀεὶ ἕpiεται ταῦτα τὰ ἴσα ὡς εἰκόνας εἶναι ἴσα τοῦ
κυρίως καὶ ἀληθῶς ἴσου. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔστι τι αὐτόισον καὶ κυρίως, piρὸς ὃ τὰ ἐνθάδε
ὡς εἰκόνες γίνεταί τε καὶ λέγεται ἴσα, τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἰδέα, piαράδειγµα. † καὶ εἰκὼν †
τοῖς piρὸς αὐτὸ γινοµένοις (Alex. Aphr. in Metaph. 83,7-17)
‘But we predicate the equal itself of the particulars here as a homonymous pred-
ication. For the same concept does not fit all of them, nor are we signifying the
truly equal. For quantity moves in the perceptibles and constantly changes and is
not defined. There is not a thing among the things here that receives the conceptual
definition of the equal in a precise way. Nor in such a way that one of them is a
model, the other a likeness. For each is no more model than likeness of the other.
But if someone accepts that the likeness is not homonymous with the model, it al-
ways follows that these equal things are equal as likenesses of the properly and truly
equal. But in that case, there will be something that is the equal itself and properly
so, in relation to which the things here come into being as likenesses and are called
equal, but that is idea, model †and likeness† for the things that come into being in
relation to it.’63
Alexander holds that when we predicate ‘equal’ of particulars we must be predicating the concept
‘equality’ homonymously (i.e. with another meaning than what we predicate of the Equal itself).
To support this Alexander cites from the definition of homonymous in the first chapter of the
Categories. The meaning λόγος of the predication is not the same if we predicate ‘equal’ of
particulars and of the Equal itself, for we then mean not that which is truly equal, as Alexander
puts it (summarising Aristotle) in Platonic terminology.
The explanation is Platonic too: for the individual perceptible is in motion and changes con-
tinuously and is not defined as something that is identical with itself. It is also not exactly that
which the λόγος of the equal encompasses.
If, however, one were to concede that ‘equal’ is stated homonymously, the problem
arises (thus Alexander) that one would have to concede that among the particulars of which
62 Dieter Harlfinger has provided a first-rate edition of this passage, which distinguishes between the recensio vulgata
and the recensio altera as being two commentary texts that should be treated separately: Dieter Harlfinger, Edizione
critica del testo del "De ideis" di Aristotele, in: Walter Leszl (ed.) II "De ideis" di Aristotele e la teoria platonica delle
idee, Firenze 1975 (Accad. Toscana di Seiende e Lettere "La Colombaria"), 17–39. The text provided by Harlfinger has
been reprinted in Gail Fine, On Ideas: Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s Theory of Forms, 3-11.
63 Cf. the translation by ibid., 17.
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one predicates ‘equal’, one is ‘equal’ in the proper sense, but the other only in a derived
sense; but that would be senseless, because neither of the two is more the paradigm of the
other than vice versa.
Thus from the homonymy of the predication it is inferred that a relation of model to like-
ness is present. If one at first only thinks, in the sense of the Categories, of predication always
primarily as predications about particulars, one must strictly conclude that one of the two relata
must be the model, the other the likeness. Hence one must accept that there is such a thing as
the equal itself, as something of which something can be predicated and in relation to which the
many equal things are equal.
Alexander continues with his complete treatment of all thinkable differentiations of differ-
ent kinds of predicate and poses the question how one could replace the difficulties mentioned
by replacing a synonymous kind of predication by one that distinguishes between proper and
improper predication.
οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν εἶναί τι piαρὰ τὰ καθ΄ ἕκαστα ἁpiλῶς οὗτος ὁ λόγος δοκεῖ
δεικνύναι, ὥσpiερ οἱ piρὸ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὸ piαράδειγµά τι εἶναι τῶν ἐνταῦθα ὄντων
κυρίως ὄν τοῦτο γὰρ χαρακτηριστικὸν εἶναι δοκεῖ τῶν ἰδεῶν µάλιστα. (Alex. Aphr. in
Metaph. 83,19-22)
‘For this argument does not seem, like the ones before it, simply to show that
there is some common thing besides the particulars, but that there is some model
of the things that have their being here, which has being in a proper sense. For that
seems to be the most characteristic for the Ideas.’
The differentiation of the simple ‘One over Many’ argument, i.e. the argument from
the abstract commonality, by the model-likeness relation thus improves the explanatory
quality of the Forms.
Against this possibility stands only (as also in Aristotle himself) the fact that this would or
must be rejected by Platonists if, as is implicitly assumed, the qualification of relatives as non-in-
dependent being, as stated in the Categories, is applied. It is telling that Alexander first affirms
that this more precise statement of the relation of similarity of particulars and (universal) Forms
is characteristic of the Theory of Forms, but then cites Aristotle himself, who says, according to
Alexander, that this is to posit Forms of relatives, which – now as a summary of Platonic doctrines
– is rejected with Aristotle’s argument from the Categories that relatives do not have independent
being, which, however, is presupposed for the Forms.64
Thus Alexander is developing, through an exegesis that makes explicit possible homonymous
and synonymous manners of predication, the sense in which the theory of Forms distinguishes
proper and improper manners of predication through the distinction betweenmodel and likeness,
and thus extends an approach that assumes straightforwardly synonymous predications.
In this he builds on his exegesis of Α 6, where he had already treated the question of syn-
onymy and homonymy in detail, in relation to the interpretation of 987b9f. (Alex. Aphr. in
Metaph. 50,19-51,25).65
For our inquiry into the strategy and organisation of the argument it is important that Alexan-
der understands the connection between 987b7-9 and 987b9f. as one continuous exegetical
movement that leads to increasing precision: (1) Aristotle at first establishes, so Alexander,
64 See above n. 49
65 On this see Carlos Steel, Plato as seen by Aristotle (Metaphysics A 6), 177f.
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that that which can be thought and grasped as something definite is termed Form by the Pla-
tonists. He then adds that every sensible-perceptible thing exists besides these Forms and is
named according to them. According to Alexander, Aristotle makes this point more precise in
his exegesis (ἐξηγήσατο) by the explanation that the sensible-perceptible particulars are ‘by par-
ticipation’, that is, they are ‘by participation’ a definite something. Alexander supplements the
text of Aristotle when he understands this last addition as ‘for most of the particulars are by
participation’ and so supplements ‘τὰ piολλά’ with ‘τῶν αἰσθητῶν’, matching his interpretation.
Through this (so Alexander) a further increase in precision is needed, which Aristotle has pro-
vided exegetically (ἐξηγούµενος) through the addition ‘τῶν συνωνύµων τοῖς εἴδεσιν’, that is, ‘of
the things synonymous to the Forms’, which means the same as ‘of the things synonymous to
these synonymous Forms’. For, so Alexander, that which is synonymous to the Forms is of this
kind. The final exegesis thus stresses the reciprocity of the synonymous relation – understood in
the sense of the Categories.
Alexander sees the ground for this exegetical move towards greater precision in the fact that
the Platonists do not accept Forms of everything.
Up to this point Alexander has stayed entirely with the exegetical movement of the Aris-
totelian argument and has been retracing it. The further exegeses supplement this basic clar-
ification. They do not present exclusive, alternative understandings (above all of the genitive
‘τὰ piολλὰ τῶν συνωνύµων’), but extend the context in which the argument is understood and
to which it is referred, that is, into which (for Alexander) it needs to be transferred. In the first
step (2) he undertakes an identification of ‘τὰ piολλά’ with ‘τὰ αἰσθητά’. That is merely a repeti-
tion of the previous exegetical move and makes clear the connection between participation and
synonymy between perceptible particulars and Forms; however, it leads to a different definition
of syntactic function.
The perceptible particulars are something definite according to the participation in those
Forms to which they are synonymous. The genitive ‘τῶν συνωνύµων τοῖς εἴδεσιν’ is thus read
as an abbreviated relative clause (51,3-7). In this movement an aspect is thus highlighted which
names the relation between definite Form and definite particular.
Something analogous occurs in the next exegetical move, which is introduced not as an alter-
native but as a further possible interpretation (3): ‘one could understand the lexis (i.e. the words
of the text) also in the following way’ (51,7). This further possibility makes explicit the relation
between one Form and many particulars. It is not just any particulars that participate in a Form,
but only those that have an equal definition and are synonymous with each other.66
In this context he extends the argumentative context with reference to Plato’s own language
in the dialogues; Plato, says Alexander, spoke about the particulars being homonymous to the
Forms, not synonymous (51,11-25). How then could Aristotle talk, in a ‘ἱστορία’ about Plato, of a
synonymy between Forms and particulars?
To explain this, Alexander differentiates the sense intended by Plato and comes to the con-
clusion that Plato in these texts founded his argument on a generic concept of homonymy, which
does not require that the particulars share only their name with the Forms. For Plato must mean
a similarity according to the λόγος or εἶδος, if the particulars have their being in relation to the
Forms, that is, they are recognised and get their definition from them. Alexander’s transfer into
the context of Platonic thought itself differentiates the exegesis further: there must be a similar-
ity between particular and Form with regard to substantive definition or meaning. That, however,
is the definition of synonymy (sc. in the Categories).
At the end of this differentiating move Alexander finally (4) supplements it with a comple-
66 See above p. 7 (on the need for differentiation of the concept of homonymy).
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mentary differentiation which addresses the distinctness of the ways in which particulars and
Forms are predicated, a distinction that must exist but which is of a different kind. This is the
Platonic distinction between a proper (κυρίως) and an improper or derived predication (51,24f.).
The four exegetical and differentiating moves described are thus not alternative proposals of
how the text is to be constituted or how the syntax of the sentence commented upon is to be con-
strued. Rather the different substantive aspects that are to be considered are unfolded one after
the other as a movement of thought that draws in different intellectual and textual contexts.
What arises from this is a panorama of all the distinctions that are necessary and helpful for
the understanding of Aristotle’s account of the problem of the relation between particulars and
Forms. Alexander builds on what he calls, in Aristotle, an exegetical movement, imitating him in
method. The knowledge that is generated by this expands a simple, preliminary understanding
of the Aristotelian text through a plethora of references and differentiations.
4.2 Ps.-Alexander, editio altera
In the editio altera that has been transmitted of Alexander’s commentary, but which recent schol-
arship has convincingly shown to be an independent, later commentary that builds on Alexan-
der,67 this movement of differentiation by means of, among other things, the conceptual armoury
of the Categories is taken further and made more explicit. The explanations on homonymous and
synonymous kinds of predication introduce as further differentiations a properly (κυρίως) syn-
onymous kind of predication, as distinct from an improperly synonymous kind of predication.
This distinction is intended to clarify the problem, discussed by Alexander, of why homony-
mous predication is, on the one hand, to be rejected, while on the other hand the differentia-
tion of model and likeness is productive. The argument against ‘proper’ synonymy is exactly as
in Alexander. However, because, as with Alexander, a homonymous kind of predication is re-
jected as impossible, a third possibility arises by establishing a systematic terminology, namely
the kind of predication that is synonymous but improperly so, which is identified with that of
the predication of particulars, on the one hand, and Forms (or: the equal itself) on the other.
Alexander’s approach of differentiating via the Platonic differentiation of proper from improper
is thus systematised.
Λείpiεται οὖν τὸ αὐτόισον κατηγορεῖσθαι αὐτῶν συνωνύµως οὐ κυρίως δέ. Τὸ
γοῦν αὐτόισον οὐ τῶνδε τῶν ἴσων τῶν αἰσθητῶν κυρίως κατηγορεῖται ἀλλὰ ἄλλου
piαρὰ ταῦτα, οὗ εἰκόνες ὡς ὁµοιώµατα τὰ τῇδε εἰσὶν ἴσα. Τοῦτο δ`ἔστιν ἡ ἰδέα. Φησὶν
οὖν ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἀκριβῶς οὗτος ὁ λόγος κατασκευάζει τὰς ἰδέας ὡς οὐ καθόλου τι
λέγων τὸ κατγηγορούµενον, ἀλλ΄ ὡς piαράδειγµα καθ΄ ὃ τὰ κατ΄ ἐκεῖνο λεγόµενά
εἰσιν, ἀλλ΄ οὖν piρός τί γε ἰδέας piοιοῦσι (τὸ γὰρ ἴσον ἐφ΄ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος piροέβη
τῶν piρός τί ἐστι piρὸς ἴσον γὰρ τὸ ἴσον λέγεται), οἱ δὲ τὰς ἰδέας εἰσάγοντες οὐκ
ἐβούλοντο ἰδέας εἶναι τῶν piρός τι. (Alex.Aphr. in Metaph. 82, alt.rec. gr. discr. 11.12)
‘Thus it remains that the Equal itself is predicated of them (sc. the sensible things)
synonymously but not properly. For the Equal itself is not predicated of these equal
sensible things properly, but of something else beside them, of which these equal
things here are likenesses like assimilations. That is the Form (idea). He thus says
that, even if this argument produces the Forms accurately, because it does not call
67Pantelis Golitsis, La recensio altera du Commentaire d’Alexandre d’Aphrodise à la Métaphysique d’Aristote et le
témoignage des manuscrits byzantins Laurentianus plut. 87,12 et Ambrosianus F 113 sup., in: J. Signes Codoñer – I.
Pérez Martin (Hg.), Between Textual Criticism and Quellenforschung (Lectio), Turnhout: Brepols (in print).
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that which is predicated something universal, but a model according to which the
things that are named after it are, they produce Forms in the category of relation (for
the equal about which the argument is conducted belongs to the category of relation,
because the equal is said in relation to something equal), those who adduce Forms
do not want Forms in the category of relation.’
With this explanation, Aristotle’s praise of this argument as ‘most exact’ (ἀκριβέστατος) in com-
parison to the preceding one is at the same time made explicit.
4.3 Asclepius of Tralles
Alexander’s commentary is ever-present in the Alexandrian commentator Asclepius of Tralles
as in all other commentators of the 5th and 6th centuries68 and it is frequently sum-
marised and quoted.69
A comparable explicit adoption and repetition of commentary cannot, on the other hand, be
demonstrated with reference to Syrianus’ commentary on the Metaphysics, but it is nonetheless
more than likely that there are references and developments that build on it. For Asclepius’
commentary is entitled an ‘Apo phones’ commentary from the lectures of his teacher Ammo-
nius.70 As in all other instances of Apo phones commentaries, here we can identify the contri-
bution of Ammonius vis-a-vis the contribution of the writer of the commentary only vaguely if
at all. The students of Ammonius all attest to the decisive role that he played in the constitu-
tion of an Alexandrian Neoplatonism and of an exegetical method by adapting the inheritance of
Syrianus and Proclus.
As Ammonius was a student of Proclus, himself a student of Syrianus, a proximity in content
and similarity in argumentative strategies between Syrianus and Asclepius is probable even where
explicit references are lacking and even though the exact words or interpretation of Syrianus are
for the most part inaccessible to us. In two passages in the commentary on Book Ζ Asclepius
mentions Syrianus by name (433,9-14 and 450,22-25), and these are in contexts that are relevant
to the debate about the Platonic Theory of Forms.71 The commentary can thus be linked at least
indirectly to Syrianus’ commentary onΜ and Ν.72
68 Cf. on this Cristina D’Ancona, Syrianus dans la tradition exégétique de la ‘Métaphysique’ d’Aristote, Pantelis
Golitsis, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la "Physique" d’Aristote: Tradition et Innovation, 60.
69 For that reason modern scholars have generally not given a sympathetic portrait of Asclepius as a commentator
on the Metaphysics. He has seemed too heavily dependent on Alexander of Aphrodisias, whom he uses and quotes
in detail. That is actually the most positive thing that Hayduck, the editor of the commentary in the CAG series, is
prepared to say about Asclepius: ‘nam Asclepius cum ipse ad verba philosophi accurate et subtiliter explicanda neque
ingenio satis valeat nec disciplina Ammonii magistri, qui placita magis Aristotelis refutare quam verba diligenter ex-
cutere studeat, satis paratus instructusque sit, ex commentariis Alexandri Aphrodisiensis, cui principem inter omnes
Aristotelis interpretes locum Bonitzius recte ac merito adisgnat, multa saepe aut excerpsit aut ad verbum descripsit.’
(‘Praefatio’ to the edition of Asclepius’ Metaphysics commentary by Michael Hayduck, CAG VI,2, Berlin 1888, v). ‘For
while Asclepius himself has for the precise and subtle exegesis of the philosopher’s words neither sufficient acuity
nor adequate training and instruction in the technique of his teacher Ammonius, who is more concerned to refute
the views of Aristotle than to weigh his words carefully, he has often taken from the commentaries of Alexander
of Aphrodisias, to whom Hermann Bonitz has rightly and admirably given first place among all commentators on
Aristotle, many things either as excerpts or paraphrases.’
70 Taran in his edition of Asclepius’ commentary on Nicomachus, 8, n. 31-35. See also Concetta Luna, Trois études
sur la tradition des commentaires anciens à la Métaphysique d’Aristote, Leiden 2001.
71 Dominic O’Meara, Pythagoras revived, e. g. 121f. See also Concetta Luna, Trois études sur la tradition des com-
mentaires anciens à la Métaphysique d’Aristote, 142-189.
72 D’Ancona argues that it was Syrianus who established Aristotle as a teaching authority not only in propaedeutic
logic but also in philosophy in the Neoplatonic schools: Cristina D’Ancona, Syrianus dans la tradition exégétique de la
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Asclepius (or his report of the lectures of Ammonius) makes even more explicit what is im-
plicit in Alexander’s analysis and in that of the commentator of the altera recensio.73 This occurs
also through direct references to texts from the Corpus Platonicum and through further expli-
cation and transfer by expanding the contextualisation of the Aristotelian arguments within the
Corpus Aristotelicum.
At the start of this explication he refers (69,17f.) to an earlier lemma toΑ 6, in which he points
out the way in which Aristotle himself (in Metaphysics Λ and in De gen. et corr. I 3) maintains
the dependence of (knowledge of) the particulars on ideas that are prior to them, which had
been developed by Plato in succession to Socrates.74 In a double apostrophe, Asclepius confronts
Aristotle with his own doctrine and its agreement with the basis of the Platonic position being
criticised, which is elucidated through references to Phaedo (44,37-45,3), Cratylus (45,3f.) and
Theaetetus (45,5-12), set in debate with Aristotle’s summary of the genesis of the Theory of
Forms.75 This explicitly expands the textual context in which the matter under examination is to
be analysed and understood, i.e. it calls for an intellectual and exegetical transfer.
Here in the commentary onΑ 9, De anima Γ 4 and 5 are included as an additional new context,
as proof of Aristotle’s closeness to the Theory of Forms in his own philosophy (69,18-22). This
time Asclepius uses the tactic of first setting up a possible objection (‘someone might say...’)
by directly confronting Aristotle with the contradiction that he himself accepts Forms but is
criticising precisely this acceptance of Forms (69,22).
Asclepius answers in Aristotle’s place and proposes to understand Aristotle’s criticism not
as criticism of Plato, but of another specific theory of Forms, different from that of Plato, which
assumes Forms that subsist in themselves and independent of the intellect (69,23-27).
Agreement with Plato is thus derived as a resolution to an argumentative contradiction within
the Corpus Aristotelicum. This occurs through a massive expansion of the exegetical context
in the Corpus Aristotelicum and in the Corpus Platonicum. The presentation of the argument
explicitly takes a position on what the relation of these textual contexts is to each other and
among themselves as a group. Here too the argumentative contradiction concerns the different
way in which the relation between particulars and Forms is understood and it is clarified through
reference to different kinds of predication.
In the commentary that follows, Asclepius then clearly and unambiguously divides off what
Aristotle says from the true explanation. ‘That is what Aristotle says. But one must know that
the number (sc. the number of things) is by no means doubled by the Forms.’ For the latter,
according to Asclepius, subsist as causes, the former as that which is caused. As abstracted
causes, however, it makes no sense to add them to the number of the perceptible things, because
they are not on the same ontological level (70,1-5). Here again Aristotle is confronted with his own
doctrine inΛ, this time inΛ 8, which, according to the unanimous view (sc. of ancient interpreters
of Aristotle), is based on an acceptance of causes (70,5-13).
An interesting aspect is the reference to homology at this point. Asclepius thus cites the
commentary tradition into which he is placing himself in his argument and upon which he is
building to draw further, much more explicit, conclusions than his predecessors.
In the further commentary on Α 9, in an analogous way, the internal contradictions be-
‘Métaphysique’ d’Aristote, 313-319.
73 Pantelis Golitsis, Les Commentaires de Simplicius et de Jean Philopon à la "Physique" d’Aristote: Tradition et
Innovation, 58-64 describes (together with Philipp Hofmann) the manner of commentary as a work of inlay, in which
in the lemmata compiled from lemma-text, theoria and lexis-explanation are compiled or supplemented from the
commentary texts transmitted in the tradition, often without naming the earlier commentator.
74 Ascl. in Metaph. 44,32-45,14.
75 Ascl. in Metaph. 44,35 and 45,13.
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tween Aristotle’s critique and his own doctrine, on the one hand, and between his critique and
the doctrine of Plato himself, on the other, are made explicit and lead to resolutions through
differentiations. That is true also in the second part of the argument of Aristotle presented
above, who says of the most exact argument that it leads to the acceptance of Forms of relatives
and to the Third Man.
τρίτον µὲν οὖν ἄνθρωpiον εἰσάγουσι τοῦτον τὸν τρόpiον. φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι τῶν
ὁµοιοτήτων ὑpiάρχουσιν αἱ ἰδέαι. εἰ τοίνυν φασὶν ὁµοίαν τὴν ἰδέαν εἶναι τῷ αἰσθητῷ
ἀνθρώpiῳ, ἐξ ἧς καὶ γέγονε, φανερὸν ὅτι ἔσται ἰδέα τῆς ὁµοιότητος ταύτης καὶ οὕτως
ἔσται τρίτος ἄνθρωpiος. (Ascl. in Met. 75,21-24)
‘Now they introduce the argument from the Third Man like this: for they say that
there are Ideas of similarities. But if they say that the Idea is similar to the perceptible
man, out of which he has also come into being, then it is clear that there will be an
Idea of this similarity. And so it will come to the Third Man.’
Asclepius adds, in order to establish that the Form is not similar to the particulars in the same
sense as the particulars can be similar, first the addition ἐξ ἧς καὶ γέγονε; what is meant by
the expression ‘Form’ is thus defined as the (formal or paradigmatic) cause of the particulars
or individual persons. Thus the hypothetical syllogism already contains, as an addition, the
argument against its substantive valence. The argument from the Third Man is by this at once
marked as substantively false.
ἀpiολογούµεθα τοίνυν ἡµεῖς ὑpiὲρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος τοῦτον τὸν τρόpiον, φάσκοντες
ὅτι ἡ ὁµοιότης ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις θεωρεῖται, τουτέστιν ἐν τοῖς καθ΄ ἕκαστα αἰσθητοῖς.
ἡ γὰρ ἰδέα οὐκ ἔστιν ὁµοία τῷ αἰσθητῷ, εἴ γε τὸ µὲν αἰσθητόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ λόγος
ἐξῃρηµένος τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. ὥστε οὐ δυνατὸν εἶναι ἰδέαν ἰδέας,... (Ascl. in Metaph.
75,29-33)
‘We reply in defence of Plato in this way, saying that the similarity is seen in the
elements, that is, in the particular perceptible things. For the Idea is not similar to
the perceptible, if the one is perceptible and the other is the Logos abstracted from
that which is perceived. Therefore it is not possible that there could be an Idea of an
Idea,...’
What has been prepared in this way is then made explicit with reference to Plato, whom Ascle-
pius mentions by name. He makes the ontological distinction of the two compared objects into
the principal object of consideration and in so doing uses a terminology current in Proclus but
attested since at least76 Porphyry, who terms the Forms, insofar as they are principles of the
particulars, as ἐξῃρηµέναι in contrast to the particulars.77
Asclepius thus criticises Aristotle for accepting an ontological similarity between perceptible
particulars and Forms; however (for Asclepius), there is in fact no such similarity as Aristotle
76 In Plotinus the formulation occurs twice in tractates of the 6th Ennead: VI.2.9.29; VI.4.16.43.
77 Porph. in Platonis Parmenidem commentaria (fragmenta. Section 6 line 28 und f.). On the term as a characterisa-
tion of the kind of universal that functions as a principle in the Analytica Priora see Arbogast Schmitt, Anschauung
und Denken bei Duns Scotus. Über eine für die neuzeitliche Erkenntnistheorie folgenreiche Akzentverlagerung in der
spätmittelalterlichen Aristoteles-Deutung, in: Enno Rudolph (ed.) Die Renaissance und ihre Antike. Die Renaissance als
erste Aufklärung, Tübingen 1998, 17–34.
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must assume for his argument, because the conceptual is ‘ἐξῃρηµένον’, that is, dimensionally
separated from the perceptible. Asclepius in this way utilises the uncovering of homonymy to
defend Plato and in doing so applies an essential insight into Aristotle’s method in debate with
Plato to elucidate the argumentation in question.
Unlike Alexander, he explicitly takes up a position in his re-contextualising arguments, and
takes sides on behalf of the Platonists. However, a point he has in common with Alexander is
that his extensions of the context and exegeses serve to elucidate individual aspects of the text
commented upon, which in this way is illuminated from all sides and transferred into a wider
discussion context and so extended intellectually.
4.4 Syrianus
Syrianus’ commentary probably did not cover BookΑ even in its original form.78
However, we find in the commentary on Μ 4, which is in large parts identical to Α 6 and
Α 9,79 an interpretation of the Aristotelian argumentation from Α and an analogous argumen-
tation and exegetical differentiation, which engages with the same, or the same but differently
combined, doxographies.80
Above we have already traced, from the perspective of the changing contexts and strategies of
argument, how parts from Α 6 and Α 9 are recombined inΜ 4 in the Metaphysics.81 For Syrianus’
commentary onΜ 4, the effect of this is that the commentary as a whole is based on the premise
of demonstrating the need for differentiation with respect to the summary about the Forms in Α
6. In this it is above all the thesis about the genesis of the theory of Forms out of Socrates’ pursuit
of definitions and the debate with Heraclitus that repeatedly moves Syrianus not only to set up
the whole argumentative movement as a set of differentiating attacks, but also to refer explicitly
to the confusions and failures to differentiate in Aristotle’s account (e. g. 105,40; 106,6f.).
Even though a certain emotional involvement can be detected in Syrianus’ commentary on Μ
4, it is more than just an angry defence against the Aristotelian critique. As we have seen,82 Syr-
ianus recognises Aristotle as a central teaching authority and writes for students of philosophy
who are not to be led astray by this authority in their understanding of the Theory of Forms.
With this didactic aim, Syrianus makes something completely different out of his exegetical
correction and, what is more, he unfolds it as a movement of differentiation in intense debate
with a style of interpretation that discusses the language of the Platonists with the resources of
the Aristotelian Organon and which locates it at the conceptual level of this propaedeutic logic.83
Syrianus’ commentary, too, is thus – in a notably explicit fashion – a resolution of contradic-
tions by further differentiating distinctions that are too simple and inadequate for the matter
78 A subtle argument on this is presented in Dominic O’Meara, Pythagoras revived, 120.
79Α 6, 987a32-b7 corresponds to Μ 4, 1078b12-25; Α 9, 990b2-991b9 corresponds to Μ 4/5, 1078b34-80a8 leaving
out the passage 1079b3-11.
80 On the divergences between Α 6 and 9 and Μ 4/5 see William David Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, ad loc. and
Julia Annas, Aristotle’s Metaphysics M and N, 131f.
81 See above p. 18.
82Cf. p. 8f.
83 Inspiring approaches to the role of Syrianus in the tradition of commentary on the Metaphysics have been pre-
sented by Dominic J. O’Meara, Le problème de la métaphysique dans l’antiquité tardive, in: Freiburger Zeitschrift für
Philosophie und Theologie 33, 1986, 3–22, who traces the formation of a metaphysical tradition through the identifica-
tion of Aristotle’s metaphysics with a form of Platonic dialectic, and in doing so investigates both the different textual
genres (commentary and deductive treatise) and the didactic perspective through which Aristotle’s Metaphysics could
be a basic text in teaching in the schools. O’Meara has, unfortunately, only pursued these approaches in a different
perspective (with regard to Iamblichus’ work ‘On Pythagoreanism’), so that there remains a research gap to be filled.
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in question. This differentiating movement includes both a doxographical differentiation and a
substantive differentiation, each of which defines equality, similarity and difference in the mat-
ter considered in a different way, and so derives different requirements for differentiation. Thus,
doxographically, it is affirmed by Syrianus that Aristotle has made differentiations where no dis-
tinctions are required on the one hand, while leaving out necessary differentiations in another
respect on the other. For Aristotle is separating Forms and eidetic numbers substantively, in spite
of the fact that, according to Syrianus, there is no substantive difference between them (‘for Form
and eidetic number are not designated in reference to something else, but (...) obviously in rela-
tion to the functional definition as model...’ 103,20-23). And in another case he is confounding
the views of the Heracliteans with those of Socrates and Plato (102,7-15).84
The greatest and most erroneous (τὸ σχετλιώτατον (104,37)) confusions are seen by Syrianus
in Aristotle’s summary of the relation between Socrates’ universal and Plato’s Forms (104,31-37).
Not only does this misunderstand the doctrines of Socrates and Plato, it describes the teacher-s-
tudent relation between Socrates and Plato falsely, and wrongly implies that Plato has ascribed
views to his Socrates that would be quite contrary to Socrates’ real views. This focus also reflects
the relation between teacher or school head and students in Syrianus’ Platonic Academy of the
5th century AD. As a glance at Proclus’ Parmenides commentary makes clear, historical truthful-
ness in regard to the teaching and life of one’s own teacher is, in the view of this school, a high –
and for the exegetical tradition even a very high – good. 85
Syrianus transfers Aristotle’s argument into a plethora of new contexts that he draws into the
exegesis and into which he embeds Aristotle’s statements in order to illuminate their inappropri-
ateness to the matter in hand; these include a series of Platonic dialogues, as well as Pythagoras
and the Eleatics. These expansions of the context, however, are merely anagogic doxographical
differentiations, which have the real goal of a substantively precise definition and ontological and
gnoseological localisation of the Forms.
For this, as well as the dialogue contexts – here again in an anagogic structure, beginning with
simple differentiations and obvious distinctions – Stoic philosophemes, too, are established as
new contexts and Aristotle’s questions are transferred into these. Through this recontextualisa-
tion, in a most interesting way – the explication of which must be the subject of a different paper,
which can address Syrianus’ doxographic exegetical strategies as a whole86 – the Stoics’ raising
of linguistic phenomena to the principle and criterion for factual distinctions is contrasted with
the Platonic procedure, in order to derive the basic localisation of the Forms in the sphere not of
abstract universals but of paradigmatic conceptual distinctions (105,21-30).
To delimit a localisation of Forms themselves at the psychic-dianoetic level, Syrianus seeks a
debate with the Middle Platonists (105,35-106,2) in order finally to stress the intermediary role
of Aristotle himself and to define the way in which Aristotle’s confusing report has influenced
others and – within a tradition of Academic Platonism thought of as continuous – has also misled
them into mixing up what should be separated (106,5-13).
These positions, which in different ways confound things, can admittedly not pursue mat-
ters into the most complex differentiations on the question of defining the ontological status
of the Forms, so Syrianus here limits himself to the reference to Pythagoras and Orphic texts
84 I am currently addressing this doxographical analysis and differentiating exegetical practice of the late antique
Metaphysics commentators intensively in a research project and further planned publications.
85 On the characters of the teachers in the Parmenides see Gyburg Radke, Das Lächeln des Parmenides. Proklos’
Interpretation zur Platonischen Dialogform (Untersuchungen zur antiken Literatur und Geschichte 78), Berlin 2006,
314-346 (on the figure of ideal teacher), 373-517 (on the historicity of the teacher Parmenides).
86 One such is planned under the working title ‘Doxographische Argumentationsstrategien bei Alexander, Syrian und
Asklepios’ (Doxographical argumentation strategies in Alexander, Syrianus and Asclepius).
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(106,14-107,3). In this last argumentative move the separation in thought between Forms and
eidetic numbers, as demanded by Aristotle but rejected by Syrianus right at the start of his com-
mentary onΜ 4 as a merely apparent need for differentiation, is completely dropped.
This context from Α 6 which is, as sketched above, extended by Syrianus through a whole
series of further textual and conceptional contexts, into which the exegetic contribution is em-
bedded as a movement of transferring knowledge, is decisive for the subsequent exegesis of the
passage in question from Α 9, which Aristotle repeats from 1078b34 in Μ 4. The movement
of differentiation that had already begun with the distinction of different ways of speaking and
thinking of something universal (esp. 105,30ff.), is continued for the exegesis of Aristotle’s argu-
ment that the theory of Forms cannot provide any ground for the claim that there should not be
Forms of everything that can be predicated.
Through the debate with what Syrianus characterises as the most shocking description of
the relation between Socrates’ method of definition and Plato’s Theory of Forms, the distinction
between different levels of thought and levels of Forms becomes necessary and is called for by
Syrianus, citing Platonic discourses.
That is reflected, for example, in the systematic division of the problems that were introduced
within the Platonic tradition to differentiate the findings about the Forms and which are made
explicit paradigmatically in Proclus’ commentary on the Parmenides (Procl. in Prm. 784,16-25).
Syrianus uses them as an introduction for a part of the commentary that is concerned with the
discussion of Forms as also formulated in A 9 (108,31-109,4). Through this, what appears in
Aristotle’s argumentation as apparently sporadic catalogues of questions about the theory of
Forms becomes systematised, but above all it is drawn into the internal Platonic tradition of
discussion and so functionalised for the differentiating clarification needed for questions that
may arise about Plato’s theory of Forms.
δοκεῖ τοίνυν τοῦτο τὸ ἐpiιχείρηµα τοῦ τρίτου piροβλήµατος εἶναι, εἴ τι κοινὸν
εἶδος καὶ ἐpiὶ τοῖς γενητοῖς καὶ ἐpiὶ τοῖς ἀιδίοις ἀpiολείpiουσιν οἱ ἄνδρες, οἷον τὸ τῆς
ὁµοιότητος ἢ ἰσότητος ἢ ταυτότητος εἶδος, οὗ µετέχει µὲν καὶ ὁ οὐρανός, µετέχει δὲ
καὶ τὰ τῇδε. (Syrian. in Metaph. 109,4-7)
‘This attack now seems to concern the third question, of whether the men posit a
common form both in the things that come into being and in the eternal things, as for
example a Form of similarity or equality or identity in which the heavens participate
but so also do the things here.’
Syrianus’ summary refers to an already established tradition of disputation. He picks out of an
extensive set of problems and an equally extensive discussion-context the four questions that are
essential, viz. whether there are Forms, what Forms there are, what is their quality, and why there
are Forms. In exactly this sense Proclus, too, refers at an early point in his Parmenides commen-
tary to a practice of discussion and differentiation that was already established in the tradition:
Τεττάρων τοίνυν ὄντων ἐν ταῖς piερὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν ζητήσεσι piροβληµάτων, piρώτου
µὲν, εἰ ἔστι τὰ εἴδη (τί γὰρ ἄν τις καὶ piερὶ αὐτῶν ἐpiισκέψοιτο µὴ τοῦτο piροδιοµο-
λογησάµενος) δευτέρου δὲ, τίνων ἔστι καὶ τίνων οὐκ ἔστι τὰ εἴδη (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο
piολλὰς ἔχει διαµφισβητήσεις) τρίτου δὲ, ὁpiοῖα δή τινά ἐστι τὰ εἴδη καὶ τίς ἡ ἰδιότης
αὐτῶν τετάρτου δὲ, piῶς µετέχεται ὑpiὸ τῶν τῇδε καὶ τίς ὁ τρόpiος τῆς µεθέξεως
(Procl. in Prm. 784,16-25)
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‘There are four problems in the investigations about the Ideas: The first of them
is whether there are Ideas (for what would one investigate about them, if there was
no agreement about that first?); the second is, of what are there Ideas and of what
not (for on that too there is much disagreement); the third is of what kind the Ideas
are and what is their specific quality; the fourth is how the things here participate in
them and what the character of this participation is.’
This is the announcement of a systematic account and discussion of the theory of Forms as es-
tablished in the Platonic schools of late antiquity, which takes up the next 23 pages of Proclus’
commentary (to 807,23). However, the passage is above all relevant for us and important as a ref-
erence-text for Syrianus’ more precise system, because, shortly before the cited passage, Proclus
has expressly addressed Aristotle’s account in Α 6, in which Socrates’ definitional philosophy is
far removed from Plato’s Theory of Forms.
Καὶ δεῖ λαβεῖν ἐκ τούτων ἐχεγγυωτέρων ὄντων, ὅτι ἄρα οὐ µόνον τῶν ὁριστῶν
ἔσχεν ἔννοιαν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν χωριστῶν εἰδῶν οὐδ΄, ὡς Α᾿ριστο-
τέλης φησὶν, ἐpiήχθη ἂν εἰς τὴν ἐκείνων θέσιν ἐκ τῆς piερὶ τοὺς ὁρισµοὺς διατριβῆς,
ἀλλ΄ ὅτι διὰ θείαν ὄντως ὁρµὴν καὶ ταῖς ἰδέαις αὐτὸς ἐpiέβαλεν (Procl. in Prm. 784,3-10)
‘One must take from this that which is more reliable, that is, that Socrates did
not just have a concept of definitions but also of the Forms possessing separate
definition. And he was not, as Aristotle says, misled into assuming them through his
pursuit of definitions, but because he himself, through a divine inspiration, grasped
the Ideas too.’
Admittedly, the passage in the Parmenides and its situation in the dialogue would tend to prompt
citation of Aristotle’s attempts at dividing Socrates from Plato, as here the young Socrates enters
a discussion with the wise old Eleatic Parmenides and is described by Plato as being right at the
start of his philosophical activity. What occurs here is the generation of a new context within
which the commenting text and the text commented upon are read and understood. For there is
a difference whether one sees Aristotle in the systematic context and traditional setting of the
Platonic tradition or whether one understands him as coming from outside and without access
to this differentiated tradition. Proclus embeds Aristotle’s account in the horizon devised by
Plato in the dialogue; conversely, with the systematic division of the problems of the Forms,
both the preceding Platonic tradition and the Aristotelian text are drawn into the exegesis of the
dialogue Parmenides.
Admittedly we do not know when the commentary on the Parmenides was written. Marinus
mentions (Marin. Procl., 13,14-17) that Proclus had written the commentary on the Timaeus and
‘many other commentaries’ by the age of 27. As Syrianus died in 437 when Proclus was 25, Syr-
ianus’ commentary on the Metaphysics must certainly be dated before the Timaeus commentary
and the other Plato commentaries. Proclus explicitly developed his exegesis of the Parmenides as
a continuation of the hermeneutic work of his teacher Syrianus. For that reason one may suspect
that the systematic structuring of the discussions within the school about accepting Forms was,
if not developed by Syrianus, then at least passed on in the Athenian School.
In Proclus we thus find the first (?) explicit reference made to Aristotle for the discussion of
Forms outside the commentaries on Aristotle. It achieves an expansion of the context for the com-
mented text in a way analogous to how Syrianus transferred Plato’s texts and texts from the Pla-
tonic tradition for the debate with Aristotle’s arguments inΜ 4 in his commentary. That fits well
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with Marinus’ report that Syrianus had guided Proclus in reading the entire Corpus Aristotelicum
and had taught him, arising from this study, Plato’sMetaphysics (Marinus, Procli Vita, 12f.).87
In this transfer, texts from the commentary tradition are adduced: that is true, for example,
for the discussion of which entities participate in the Forms. Syrianus refers to these discussions
in his exegesis of 1079a3ff.88 By referring to Numenius and Cronius he is citing the exegetical
tradition of the 2nd century, probably specifically the commentaries on the Timaeus; by refer-
ring to Porphyry, the student of Plotinus, he is citing the first of the Platonic commentators
who systematically commented upon Aristotle as well as Plato for didactic purposes.89 Syrianus
functionalises this tradition ‘of the best among the Platonists’ (109, 11f.) to clear up possible
confusions and errors that Aristotle’s argumentation could have prompted. The following pas-
sage (109, 12-26) is presented as a summary of a complex discussion which is able to clear up the
aporiai formulated by Aristotle as substantive problems.
In this context fits the cue from Α 6 for the critical debate with Α 9, as combined by Aristotle
in Μ. Syrianus does not reflect on aspects of the genesis of the text or on the repetition from
BookΑ. However, for his method, which expands the context of the interpreted text and transfers
Aristotle’s arguments into the context of the whole Platonic discussion of Forms beginning with
Plato and Middle Platonism, this synthesis is revealed as helpful, because the discussion of the
theory of Forms can build on the differentiations that arise from the analysis of the relation of
the Socratic universal to the Platonic Form.
In this context, expanded by transfer, Syrianus also adds the work of differentiation achieved
by Alexander with reference to the possibility of predicating something of Form and particular
things either synonymously or homonymously. For this he begins once again with a synoptic
survey of the differentiations that the Platonic tradition has achieved so far with reference to
different eidetic levels, which makes the question of the ‘third man’ appear as something that
lies far below the niveau of this discussion:
piῶς δὲ καὶ τὸν τρίτον εἰσάγουσιν ἄνθρωpiον εἰ µὲν γὰρ ὅτι καθ΄ ἑκάστην τῶν
ὄντων τάξιν ἐστὶ piάντα τὰ εἴδη, οὐ τρεῖς µόνοι, piολλοὶ δὲ οἱ ἄνθρωpiοι, ἐpiεὶ καὶ piάντα
piολλαpiλᾶ (Syrian. in Metaph. 111, 27-29)
‘How then do they introduce the Third Man? For if it is because all the Ideas are at
each level of being, then there would be not just three but many men, for everything
is multiple.’
Against this background the differentiation between synonymy and homonymy may appear use-
ful and productive, but of only subordinate importance.
87 Henri Dominique Saffrey, Recherches sur le néoplatonisme après Plotin, Paris 19990, 176-179.
88 That is the same textual context that Proclus uses in his lemma to Ti. 37cd, where he refers to Porphyry, Numenius
and Amelius and finally, as the interpretation that provides the solution, Iamblichus (Procl. in Ti. 3, 33, 31-34,7: εἰ
µὲν γάρ, ὡς ᾤετο Πορφύριος καί τινες ἄλλοι Πλατωνικοί, µόνα µετεῖχε τῶν ὄντως ὄντων τὰ αἰσθητά, ἐν αὐτοῖς µόνοις
ἂν ἐζητοῦµεν τὰς εἰκόνας. εἰ δ΄, ὡς ᾿Αµέλιος γράφει καὶ piρὸ ᾿Αµελίου Νουµήνιος, µέθεξίς ἐστι κἀν τοῖς νοητοῖς, εἶεν
ἂν εἰκόνες καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς. εἰ δὲ ὁ θεῖος Πλάτων οὔτε ἐν τοῖς piρωτίστοις τῶν ὄντων ἀpiέθετο εἰκόνας οὔτ΄ ἐν µόνοις
τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, νικῴη ἂν καὶ τούτοις ὁ piάντας ἐν piᾶσιν ὀλίγου δέω φάναι κρατῶν ᾿Ιάµβλιχος ὁ τὰς µεθέξεις ἐpiί τε τῶν
µέσων κἀpiὶ τῶν τελευταίων θεωρεῖν piαρακελευόµενος.)
89 George Karamanolis, Porphyry, the first Platonist Commentator of Aristotle and id., Plato and Aristotle in Agree-
ment? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry, Oxford 2006 and id., Why Porphyry wrote Aristotelian
Commentaries?, in: Benedikt Strobel (ed.) Die Kunst der philosophischen Exegese bei den antiken Platon- und Aristote-
les-Kommentatoren, Berlin/New York 2014, 1–35 (pagination from the the online self–publication).
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εἰ δ΄ ὅτι συνώνυµος µὲν ὁ αὐτοάνθρωpiος τοῖς τῇδε, καθά φησιν ἐξηγούµενος
τὸ ῥητὸν ὁ Α᾿λέξανδρος, piάντα δὲ τὰ συνώνυµα µετουσίᾳ τινὸς εἴδους συνώνυµα
γίγνεται, τρίτος ἀναφανήσεταί τις ἄνθρωpiος τῆς ἰδέας καὶ τῶν τῇδε κατηγορούµενος,
γελοῖον γίγνεται τὸ ἐpiιχείρηµα οὔτε γὰρ συνώνυµα τὰ τῇδε τῇ ἰδέᾳ piότε γὰρ αἱ
εἰκόνες συνώνυµοι τῷ σφετέρῳ γένοιντ΄ ἂν piαραδείγµατι οὔθ΄ ὅλως µετέχειν τινὸς
τὴν ἰδέαν οἰητέον αὐτὴ γὰρ ἔκκειται piᾶσιν εἰς µετοχὴν τὸ piρώτιστον εἶδος οὖσα. εἰ δὲ
ὁµωνύµως κατηγορεῖται αὐτῶν ὁ ἄνθρωpiος, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὁµωνύµοις κατηγορίαις οὐδέν
ἐστι piρᾶγµα συνεισφερόµενον ὑpiὸ τῆς φωνῆς piαρὰ τὰ ὑpiοκείµενα καὶ ὁµώνυµα
λεγόµενα, piῶς ἂν ἔτι χώραν ὁ τρίτος ἄνθρωpiος ἔχοι, τῆς φωνῆς οἱονεὶ δαpiανωµένης
καὶ διαιρουµένης εἴς τε τὸν αὐτὸ καὶ τὸν θνητὸν ἄνθρωpiον (Syrian. in Metaph.
111,33-112,6)
‘If, however, Man itself is <predicated> synonymously to the men here, as Alexan-
der interprets what is said, and everything that is synonymous becomes synonymous
through commonality (metousia) with an Eidos, a third man who is predicated of the
Idea and of the <men> here, will appear, then the approach becomes laughable. For
neither are the things here synonymous to the Ideas – for when would likenesses be-
come synonymous to their model? – nor can one believe that the Idea participates in
anything at all, for it stands ready for participation by everything, as it is the primary
Form (εἶδος). If ‘man’ is predicated homonymously of these, however, and among the
homonymous predications no thing is introduced by the word-form besides that of
which the predicate is made and that which is homonymously predicated, how can
there be room there for the Third Man, for an expression that, so to speak, can be
divided and cut up into the ‘itself’ and the ‘mortal man’?’
Thus, as by Asclepius so also by Syrianus, Alexander’s argument is picked up and its implication,
that Aristotle’s argument against the theory of Forms has no valence, is made explicit. This
occurs within the context, newly created by Syrianus for the Aristotelian argument, of the whole
Platonic discussion of the relation of Form and participating instances.
5 Conclusion
The analysis of how Platonic discussions are functionalised for the differentiating exegesis of the
text of Aristotle at Α 9, Α 6 and Μ 4 of the Metaphysics has shown that by re-contextualising
the Aristotelian arguments in a long-standing Platonic discussion of Forms and of the Platonic
discussions in the context of the works of the Organon, which formed the basic logical instruction
in the philosophical schools, movements of knowledge occur, and so differentiated knowledge is
generated in the context of the institution of the late antique Platonic philosophical schools.
With his strategies of argument at Metaphysics Α and Μ, Aristotle himself provides models
for the exegetical techniques of the ancient commentators. By analysing the Platonic Theory
of Forms with the conceptual instruments of the Categories, the perspective of the descriptive
analysis of our linguistic access to what we grasp of things intellectually has been transferred
into the discussion of Forms. Together with this, a certain niveau is assumed in differentiation.
Aristotle’s arguments show that, and in what respect, this degree of differentiation is inadequate
for the complex substantive questions in the discussion of Forms and so must lead to aporia.
They also show how Aristotle gives argumentative functions to the doxographic survey of Platonic
positions, for the purpose of extending knowledge. In these functions, the confrontation with the
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simple conceptual instruments of the Categories plays a central role.
Aristotle himself in the Topics shows ways in which the simple differentiating tools of the
Categories can be developed further and transferred into other contexts. The conceptual pair
homonymous-synonymous is extended in the Topics and in the Sophistici Elenchi and in Meta-
physics Γ into a differentiated concept of homonymy. This concept inquires, when further deve-
loped again, into the διὰ τί of the coincidence in name and into the specific kind of substantive
similarity and proximity to which the coincidence in name can be traced. In this way, a substan-
tive connection is proposed between the homonymous meanings. This supplements the approach
of the Categories by adding an explanatory level that can be used methodically. For Aristotle de-
scribes the discovery of homonymies as a first step to the resolution of contradictions, with the
goal of the differentiating explication of the substantive content.
The ancient commentators use this model of differentiation provided by the tools of the Ca-
tegories (and the works of the Organon as a whole) for the didactic study of Aristotle’s debate
with earlier thinkers. The potential expansions of the textual context for the sake of differen-
tiating the concepts are used in such a way that texts from the Corpus Aristotelicum (and in
the case of Alexander also from the exoteric work Περὶ ἰδεῶν), those from the Corpus Platoni-
cum and those of the commentary tradition on both authors are set alongside each other and
drawn into conversation.
The result is a new text that, faced with the intentionally reductive Aristotelian argument,
opens up for the reader the possibility of making other texts of the tradition useful for differen-
tiation and so of generating new knowledge. In these argumentative strategies there is a transfer
of concepts and methodical approaches. For these, as for any other form of transfer, that which
is transferred undergoes a change through the very fact that it is transferred. The terms and
models must be re-thought for and in reference to the new context, and must be explained and
differentiated anew.90
Thus the commentaries contribute to elucidating the Aristotelian argument by establishing a
concrete, linked Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, within which the argument is localised and hence
differentiated. In a context that consists both of contributions from the tradition of Platonic
thought right back to Plato, which attempts to differentiate the issue of the function and defini-
tion of the Forms, and of the differentiation of the simple tools for making distinctions provided
by the Organon, Aristotle’sMetaphysics becomes knowledge set in motion.
90 A certain tendency can be discerned that tends to an ever greater degree of explicitness as regards the discovery
of possible errors or erroneous interpretations. The confrontation of three parallel texts admittedly permits such a
statement only as an impression that needs to be verified by the analysis of other commentaries.
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